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PREFACE 
This paper will investigate th e influ e nce exerted by the Unite d 
State s Navy through congressional committees . on the formulation of 
Ame rican fore ign policy follow ing World War II. Th e events and 
decisions cov e r e d are limite d to the p e riod 1944 to 1961, except 
foranhi s toricpe rspecti ve exf e nding back·to the l ate nine t eenth c e ntury. 
The year 1944 was selected as the beginning of d e t a ile d inves -
tigation b ecau se the fir s t formal committee h ea rings on postwar 
unification policy were h e ld the n. Since Preside nt John F. Kenne dy's 
administration prove d to b e a wate r s h e d in Ame rican military policy 
it was d e cide d to t e r m ina t e this p a p e r with a f ew o.b se rva tions on the 
effects of Secreta ry of De f ense RobertS. McNa m a r a ' s tour 1n offic e . 
The McNama r a yea rs in th e P ent agon w ill r e quir e separate and 
sp e ci a l study, when objective historical p e rsp e ctive p e rmits . 
The inte rr e l ation of milita ry policy and for e ign policy since 
World W a r II logically l eads to the r ealization that virtu a lly eve ry 
asp e ct of n aval policy h as some b e aring on for eign policy. In s t ead of 
trying to cover too much area and do too l ittle ju s tic e to any one aspect 
of military and for e ign policy, two i ss ues were selected for mor e 




in the resolution of both of these issues, and the y ar e good case 
studies in the political activity of naval offic e rs after World War II . 
The first is the "unification controversy" which has roots 
extending back to Wor l d War I and which influenc e d every subsequ e nt 
deve l opme nt in military policy including military organi z ation, the 
use of nuclear weapons, postwar d e fense organization and national 
s trategy . The second issue conce rns the change in the United State s' 
attitude toward Spa in afte r World War II, and how the Navy assisted 
the C ongr e ss in urging a change in Ame rican re l ations with Spain in 
the fac e of executive branch opposition. 
A good part of the paper is give n ove r to discussion on g e n e ral 
is sue s which a~ e n e c e ssary to an uncle rstanding of the .Navy ' s role 
i n politics. These include the naval offic e r 1 s traditional p e rc~ption 
of ''politics, 11 as opr)Q s ed to the n e c e ssity of participation; the function 
of the Congr e ss in for e ign policy, and the relationship b e tween the . 
military and the l e gis lativ e branch; and the activities of the "Navy 
l obby" in atte mpting to influ e nce policy decisions through Congress. 
A number of pertinent areas of Navy influe nce on policy through 
C ongress were m e ntione d only briefly or were l eft out of this study, 
becaus e of limite d space, although the y are e qually as important as 
the i s sue s include d in the p a p e r. The s e include nucle ar policy, 
military aid and assistance, nucle ar pow e r for submarines and 
surfac e ships, the Polaris program, the Pacific Trust T e rritori e s 





The broad issues of national st r a t egy a r e tr eat ed very l ightly, 
particularl y Preside nt Eis e nhow e r's "Ne w Look," although th e 
Navy and Congress.we r e d eeply involved. 
One particular aspect of the Navy ' s influence on for e ign policy 
1s the ship loa n acts pass ed aft e r World War II, enabling fri endly 
nations to maintain thei r n av i es whe n the y wer e una ble to afford to 
construct or buy n aval vess e ls on the ir own. The r e was insufficient 
time to prope rly r e search this subj e ct, and I intend to s ubmit it 
as a p oss ible PhD. diss e rta tion topi c for some ti1ne in the futur e . 
The r esearch conducte d for this pape r indicates the r e is a 
staggering amount of informa tion to cover, and that l ittle has b ee n 
publishe d in the, g e neral area of th e military and politics . The mor e 
specific but still va s t subj e ct of th e Navy anc' Congre ss after Wor l d 
War II offe rs great po ssibilities to the scholar and ext ensive 
res earch will undoubte dly r e v eal valuable conclusions on modern 
civil-military r e l a tions . 
. 
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Complete integ ration of United States foreign policy and military 
policy in contemporary politics is a reality. Assumption of free world 
leade rship by the United States in the uns e ttled years since World War 
II has made very e l e ment of Am e rican power -- economic, military, 
social, political and technological --integral to for e ign policy. 
The formul a tion of for e ign policy is nom_inally a function of the 
executive branch of the govermnent, which calls on Congres s for fLmds 
n ecessary to support d eci sions to act and on the S e riat e to ratify treat ie s. 
The pow e rs give n Congress by the Constitution to rai se and support the 
arme d forc es giv e the l e gislative branch furth e r involvement in for e ign 
affairs, since military policy i s continually subject to congressional 
oversight . 
Military offic e rs have two means of exe rting influ e nc e .on national 
policy. The fir s t and more "official" m eans is through the s e rvice chain 
of command, the civilian s ervic e secretary, and the Joint Chi e fs of 
Staff. Broad milita ry policy d ecisions are made in the exe cutive branch 
by the S ec r e t a ry of Defense and ultimate ly by the President. If service 





the military has the risky option of pres e nting the ir views to Congress 
through t es timony b e for e committees and through public relations and 
11 l eg i slative liaison'' acti vi ties . The ran1ifi cations of the se approaches 
to Congress will be discuss e d in greater detail in subs e que nt chapte rs. 
Evaluating how much or e v en whether for e ign policy is influenced 
through Congress results in purely subj e ctive conclusions . Admiral 
Arle igh Burke , former Chi e f of N a va l Ope rations, says, "the influ e nc e 
varies greatly du e to p e rsonalities, the typ e of event its e lf, and th~ 
gene ral state of the wor ld. " 1 · Thomas Sche lling, writing on dete rr e nc e 
and military dipl oma cy, says: 2 
E very change in the d e f e ns e budget, eve ry selection 
of a major weapon system, every Congr e ssional h e aring 
of th e annua l budge t of the arrne d forc e s, is diplom a cy. 
It is diploma cy, b eca us e at l e ast one strong motive 
b e hind any act ion take n is to communicate sornething 
to the l eaders of potential enemy countri es about 
what we can do and about what we will do. 
Es sentially, what i s said publicy by the Ame rican gov e rnme nt, exe cutive 
or l e gislative branches, contributes to Ame rican foreign policy as oth e r 
nations unde rstand it . This applies not only to pote ntial " e n e my" 
countries. Th e disposition of military forc e s, politica i b a rgaining, 
1. L e tte r from Admiral Arl e igh A . Burke , U.S. Navy (R e tir e d } 
to th e author, date d March 11, 1968. 
· 2. Thomas C. Sche llin g, "De t e rr e nc e : Military Diplomac y in th e 
Nucl e ar A ge ," Virginia Quart e rly R evi ew , Vol. 39, No. 4, 
Autumn, 1963, reprinte d in Conduct of N a tiona l S e curity Policy, 
s e l ected r eadings, Committee on G ave rnment Ope rations, Unite d 
States S enat e , Subcommitt ee on N a tiona l Se curity and Inte r-
national R e lation s, 89th Cong . , lst sess . ('Wa s hington: G. P. 0 . , 
1965), p . 44 . 
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policy statements, alliances, economic policy, and propaganda may 
foster the growth of fri e ndly faction s within fo re ign governments. 3 
In addition, Congress is now mor e d eeply invo lve d with milita ry 
policy-make r s within the services. The high l e v e l of d e f e n se activiti es 
r e quir e d by the Cold War increase d congressional inte r es t in military 
policy and administration. The locus of congre ssional-military relations 
e xpande d from the supply units of the military depa rtme nts with thei r 
atten dant 11 spoils 11 opportunities to include the professional h eads of the 
services . Congress is seemingly more inte r es t e d in the strategic 
effect s of military m a t e ri e l funde d through appropriations, although th e 
lur e of constituent 11pork-barre ling 11 has not d ec r ea s e d. 
Increas e d inte r es t notwithstanding, Congress is still at a dis-
advantage r e lative to the E xe cutive in the making of for e ign policy. 
Roger Hilsman, form e r Assistant Secre tary of State for Far Easte rn 
Affair s, r e f e rs to the pow er ov e r information and the 11ple thora of 
expertis e 11 that give to the Exec utive what might b e _ calle d 11th e inte llectual 
initiative iri for e ign policy. 11 Congress can criticize , add to, am.end, or 
_ b~ock an action by the Executiv e , Hilsman says, but can rar e ly succee d 
in forcing the Exec utive 1 s attention to 11the n ee d for a change in policy, 11 
and can h a rdly ever d evelop and secure the adoption of an alternative 
3. John W es l ey Ma s land and L a ur e n ce Ingram R a dway, Soldi e rs 
and Schola r s : Military Edu cation and National Policy 
(Prin ceton: Pr inc e ton Unive r si ty Press , 1957), p. 26 . 
-4 policy of its own. 
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If Congr ess as a whole is more int e reste d in military policy the 
real support in Congress in b ehalf of the military stems from a few 
active, hard- core supporters. A Congressman or S e nator who consi s-
tently b acks military programs usually has a strong sense of identifica-
tion with one or another of the military services. This identification 
can usua lly b e traced to one or more of the following: first, the 
Congressman has e njoyed a fairly long-te rm, gratifying r e lationship 
with th e service concerned; second, h e has ·been a member of the 
House or Senat e Militar y Affairs Committee, or the Military Appropria-
'tions Subcommittee ; third, he might have served military duty in th e 
service 1 s active 'o r reserve component ; finally, the service concerned 
maintains k ey installations in the l egis lator ' s constituency . 5 
In spite of the l e gis l ator ' s inte r es t in military policy the arme d 
services are still fac e d with a dilemma -- military security . The military 
wants to minimiz e the dange r of inte rnal politics within the services 
which would surely result if every self-de clared spokesman was fr ee to 
air his opinion s to Congress. The military also h esitates to bring up 
highly-cla ssi fi e d mate rial even in closed committee session, consider ing 
4. Roger Hilsman, "Congressional-Exec utive R e lations and the 
For e i gn Policy Cons ens us," R eadings in th e Making of Ame rican 
For e ign Policy, Andr ew M . Scott and Raymond H . Dawson, eds . 
(N ew York: The MacMillan Company, 1965 ) , p. 189. 
5 . D emetr io s Caraley , The Politics of Military Unification (New 
. York: Columbi a Unive rsity Press , 1966 ) , p. 86. 
5 
the laxity of many Congre ssrn ~n and Senators in r e gard to such infor-
mation. Whi l e some of the leakage from Congress results from 
indiscretion, m.e mbers of Congress who disagree with administration 
pol ici e s may l e ak information in th e hope public disclosure will cause 
a proje ct to be abandone d . 6 
Until rec e ntly military offic e rs w e re faced with restrictions that 
transcende d security . The possibility that t e stimony not in sympathy 
w·ith administration policy could curtail a promising career also preve nts 
offic e rs from spe aking out on issues b e fore Congi· e ss. The provi s ion 
in the National S e curity Act of 1949 permitting a membe r of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to pr e sent to Congr e ss "on his own initiative, afte r first 
informing the S e cr e tary of Defe ns e , any recommendation relating to the 
7 Departme nt of D e f e nse that h e may de e m prope r 11 :-vas a legal milestone 
1n the shift from the pr e war patte rn . This provision w a s the first in 
the United State s statut e s which authori ze d a military chief to take his 
opinions directly to Congress . In spite of the law, -the old restriction 
still hold s true. Pre side nt Truman di smia s e d his Chie f of Naval 
Qperations, Adxniral Louis E. Denfield, in 1949 after the "Re volt of the 
Admirals. 11 
Regarding pre s sure from the Exe cutive, Morris Janowitz b elieve s 
the Chiefs of Staff have shown "considerabl e political r e sponsibility" 
6. Louis Smith, Ame rican D e mocracy and Military Power (Chicago: 
University of Chi c ago Pr e ss, 1951 ) , p . 237. 
7 . Samue l P. Huntington, The Soldie r and the Sta t e ( Cambridge : 
Belknap Pr e ss of Harvard Univ e rsity, 1957), pp . 415 - 41.6 .. 
• 
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1n expre ssing opinions to Congress, "while at the same tinl.e demon-
strating their loyalty to the Secretary of D e fens e and the exe cutive 
branch of the gov e rnme nt. J3 Military leader .s do not particularly enjoy 
walking this tightrope, but military officers in recent years have b e corne 
less pol itically naive, and in some cases have been willing to take care er 
risks to air th e policies of their s e rvices b e fore Cqngress . Regardless 
of their own care e rs, and in spite of increasing political awareness, 
military officers must avoid intentionally e mbarrassing the adminis -
tration or straying b e yond their field of e xpe rtise into those of politics 
and diplomacy. Since Congress lacks th e "initiative" in policy-making, 
as Roge r Hilsman remarked, the legislatur e is confine d to exercising 
11 oversightrr of the exe cutive branch, hop e fully distinguishing betwe e n 
scrutiny of the exe cutive r s performance and inte rfe renee in administra -
ti ve ope rations. S e nator J oseph S. Clark summed up the ove rsight 
function as follows:9 
O ver s ight, by l e gislative and inv e stigating committe es, 
through the annual appropriations process and the 
almo s t daily contact of individual Congressme n with 
the bure aucracy, enables C ongre ss to maintaih at 
least some control ove r what j s going on in the far-
fl ung and enonnous executiv e branch; 
The value of congressional hearings goes beyond the rrwatchdogrr 
8. Morris Janow it z , The Profe ssional Soldier (Gle nco e : The Free 
Press, 1960) , J?· 359 . 
9 . J os e phS. Clark, Congres s: T h e S a ple ss Branch ( N e w York: 
Harp e r & Row, 1964 ) , p. 84 . 
• 
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function, to include the following: first, hearings provide the b es t means 
for educating the public on political issues , ofte n d es cribe d by members 
of Congress as the most important r es ult of hearings. S e cond, h ea rings 
alert th e voters to a p articul ar m e asure unde r consideration, providing 
them with the opportunity to make the ir wishes known in advanc e of 
congressional action . Third, congressm e n can use h earings to publicize 
their own vi ews , particularly in opposition to the policies of the 
Administration. Th e r ecent Fulbright C ommittee h earings on Uni t ed 
States comrnitment s a broad are a good exar:nple . Finally, committee 
h earings afford the opportunity for m embe rs of Congress to obtain 
-information and unde rstanding of propo se d l egislation. 
While committee h e arings perform a valuable function as a public 
forum , pr ese nting divergent views on important is sues , the mundan e 
day-to-day work of the committee s is essentia l to the fun c tioning of the 
l egi s lature . S e nator Thomas Dodd and R e pr esentative Carl Albe rt 
explaine d th e importanc e of congress ional committees to a r e porter :l 0 
No indi vidual could hope t o b e come fully informe d 
on th e hundreds of complex questions upon which 
Senators must vote e ach yea r. M ember.s of the 
committees concerned wi th these questi ons can 
b ecome thoroughly informe d, and a S e nator must 
fr e quently r e ly upon the judgment of the 
committees .. 
Congress , like most l arge organizations, functions 
through a division-of-labor m e thod know n in 
thj s cas e as the committe e sys t e m. M e mb e rs n1.ust 
10. "What ' s Wron g With Congress 118 Membe rs Answ e r," 
U.S . N ews and World R e port, Vol. 49, No. 11, S e ptemb e r 
12, 1960, p. 60. 
• 
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tru s t th: ir colleagL1 es to s p ec i a li ze and to do 
th e n e c e s sary r esearch a nd con duct the n e c e ssary 
inve stiga tions in the variou s fi e ld s . 
M o s t of the shaping of l e gi s l a tion is done 1n committee rooms. 
The l arge numbe r a nd complexity of l e gis l ative proposals, th e tradition 
in C ongres s of d e f e rring to the "spe ci a list," the s e arch for ways to 
accornoda t e confli c ting press ur es on congressme n, the siz e of Congr e ss --
all con spire to incre as e the authority of committee action. According 
to a study on congr e ssional committee s, 90 p er c e nt of a ll th e work in 
C l . l t . . . d t . . tt 1 1 on gr e ss on e g1s a 1v e m a tt e r s 1s ca rr1e 9u 1n comm1 ee . 
Congr e ssiona l influe nc e on military matte rs is exe rte d most 
effectively through the Subcommittee s on Military Appropriations . 
11 The milita ry budge t is the singl e mos t important annua l contact 
b e t we e n the milita ry an d Congr e s s , 11 write s Sam ue l P. Huntington. 
"lt affords C ongr es s the opportunity to cons ide r and lay do w n th e broad 
lin e s of military policy and to r e vi e w in e xhau s tiv e d e tail military 
proc e du r e and administration. " 12 Congress cannot for ce the Executive 
to act, a s iilu s tra t e d by the mone y appropriated and e arma rke d fo r the 
RS- 70 bombe r, which the adrnini s tr a tion refus e d to sp e nd. But Congre ss 
can us e appropri a tions committee m eetings to r e vi e w and critici ze . 
administra tion policy. The early 19 63 S e nate Subcommittee on Military 
Appropriations r e v i ew ed in d e tail the governme nt 1 s actions during the 
11. Charles L. Cla pp, The Cong r e ssman (Wa s hington: Brookings 
Institute, 19 63 ) , p. 2 13 . 
12. Huntin gton , The Sol di e r a nd th e State , p . 4 07. 
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Cuban missile crisis of 1962. 
Appropri a tions committees may subject l egis l a t i on to a kind of 
"double j eop a rdy, 11 as usua lly separate appropriations acts are r e quir e d 
to put into action programs authorized by l egislation originating in othe r 
cqmmittees . 13 
Cons ide ring the i1nportance of congressional committees in 
shaping the country ' s for e ign and military polici es , th e complexity of 
the l egi s lative process, and the "adve rsary" theory inherent in the. 
sepa r a tion of powe rs, how does the profess iona l mili tary officer thr ead 
his way throu gh th e morass? T wo examples of military influe nc e on 
for e ign and military policy will b e di sc u sse d in subs e qu ent chapters: 
the "unification controversy" and the d e bate on nationa l milita ry strategy 
that b egan during World War II, and the initial political mane uvers tha t 
l e d to th e insta lla tion of Unite d States military faciliti es in Spain in the 
1950' s . 'J;'he inte r es ts and politica l activities of U.S. N avy offic e rs in 
each of these controversies wi ll b e stressed . 
13 . Burton M. Sa pin, The Making of Unite d States For e ign Policy 
(New York: Fr e d e rick A . Prae g e r, 1966), p. 42 . 
• 
CHAPTER II 
THE MILITARY AND POLITICS 
Military tr a dition m the Unit e d Sta t e s dicta t es that the profes s ional 
offic e r is 11a b o v e politic s" m domes ti c affa ir s . In an author i taria n 
soci e ty, to b e above politic s mean s tha t the office r i s con1.mi tt e d to the 
statu s quo; unde r d emoc rati c the ory b ein g " a bove politi cs " r e quir e s 
that offic e r s do not atta ch th e ms e l ve s to political parties or overtly 
displa y pa r~isan ship. 1 
In the Unite d Sta t es , f e d e r a l l aw as we ll a s strong tradition pr e -
elude c a r ee r milita ry offic e r s fr om the a c tive role in domestic p olitics 
enjoy t:! d b y -othe r citi zens. 2 
The fr a m e r s of the Con s tit ution , in e stablishing th e Ame rican 
politica l s y s t e m, d e vi se d the ''s e p a r a tion of p owe rs" to pr e v e nt 
exe cutive bra n ch d omin ance in the Gove rnme nt; too ofte n a n authorita tive 
h e ad of sta t e found much of hi s str e ngth a nd support m hi s army. Although 
the Preside nt of the Unite d States is the Comma nde r in Chi e f of the Arme d 
1. Morris J a now itz , Th e Profes sional Soldie r (Gle nco e : The Free 
Pres s, 1960 }, p. 2 33 . 
2. Rob e rt A. L o v e tt, "Role of the Milita r y S e rvic es in Go ve rnment, 11 
R eadings in th e M a king of Am e rica n For e i gn P ol ic y, Andr e w M . 
Scott and R aymond H . Daws on , e d s .(New York : The M acMilla n 





Forces, th e.se forces can b e rai sed and supported only by Congr ess . 
These Constitutional restrictions ent ere d the Am.e rica n conscious 
and took shape as a r ecur ring di s tru s t and di s like of "the military. 11 
The American public t ends to b e lieve that military offic e rs are neither 
trustworthy nor competent to become involve d in politics. Profess or 
Huntington presents this the sis in saying: 3 
Politics i s b eyond the scope of military compe t ence , and 
the p a rticipation of military officers in politics unde r-
mines thei r professionalism, curtailing their professional 
competence , dividing the profession against itself, and 
substituting . extraneous values for professiona l values. 
The military officer must r emain neutral politically. 
The Unite d States Navy, mor e consciou s ly aware of tradition than 
th e other services, has b een fairly meticulous over the years in k eeping 
its officer corps "above politics. 11 Vincent Davis , a student of the rnilitary 
and politic s , b e l ieves tha t nava l officers' "broader s ense of isolation" 
characterizes the thinking of seafaring m e n everywhere. Mor e dir e ctly, 
Davis says, the ir r e j ection of politica l activity r eveals how thoroughly 
Am e rican naval officers have b een influe nc e d by the Navy's history and 
"with the traditional Ame rican b e lie f that the armed forc es as well as 
individual military officers should in no s e nse ~ngage 11in politics. 1114 
Admiral G e orge Dewey succinctly stated th e Navy's attitude on politics 
3. ·Samu e l P . Hun tington, The Soldie r and the State (Cambridge : 
B e lknap Pre ss of H a r va rd Unive rsity, 19 5 7), p. 71. 
4. Vincent Da vis, The Admiral s Lobby (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press , 19 67), pp. 8 -9. 
• 
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when h e said: "The Navy i s one pr o fession, politics another . . . 
" 
althoughh e did profe ss inte rest 111. a possible Pres idential nornination 
in 1900. 
Nava l offic e rs 1 alienation frorn domestic politics is b ase d on more 
th-an adher e nce to th e alinost mystical p e rsuasion of n aval custorns and 
traditions . The Unit e d States i s no longe r the sea- ori e nte d maritime 
nation of th e e arly e i ghteenth c entury. Tho se Am e ricans w h o follow the 
sea f eel i sol a t e d from th e changing t empers of c ontempora ry society, 
and misunde r s to od by the public at l a rge. As a r es ult, rnany in the 
offi ce r corps profe ss a meas ur e of scorn for "politics" and "politicians.'? 
Howeve r, the realiti e s of the A me rican politica l sys t em cornpel 
mo s t Uni t ed Sta t es governme nt bureaucrats to f e el they must p a rticipate 
in an internecine struggle for s urv i val. 6 The government bureaucracy 
includes the military, at l eas t in Washington . Con sequently, military 
offic e r s ar e encourage d by tradition and regulations t o think an d talk as if 
they were not in p olitic s, although th e system causes them t o f ee l com-
p e lle d t o participate. 7 
In addition to the r e quir eme nts of Washington 1 s b ureaucracy, the 
military r eal ize d afte r World War II that the y could not articulate in a 
5. Char l es 0. L erche, Jr . , 11 The Professional Office r and Foreign 
Policy, 11 U.S. Naval Insti tute Proceedings, Vol. 90., No. 7, 
July, 1964, p. 70 . 
6. Davi s, The Adm irals Lobby, p. 4. 
7 . Ibid . 
• 
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·vacuum the cornpJ.cx is sues of for e ign ·aid, d e fense planning, mutua l 
security, and sci e ntific r esearch tha t have b e come nec essary el e1nents 
in th e profe s sion of arms . The tighte ning of civilian control of the 
military a ft e r World Wa.r II and the rising importanc e of constantly-
changing t echnology have l arge ly destroyed the professional military 
offi cer 's romantic position 11above politics. 11 
The r ecent turn of s01ne of the profes sional military toward 
politic s is explaine d by Harold Stein by three phenomena of th e po s t- w ar 
era.. First, the sheer mone t ar y magnitude ·of the modern Ame rican 
military e ffort. Men who are r esponsible for p e rsuading Congre ss to 
appropriate billions of dollars for d e f e ns e live in a highly-charge d 
politica l atmo sphe r e r e gardle ss of the strong hand of civilian control 
exercised by the Preside nt, the Se c retary of D e f e nse, and several 
thou sand othe r civilians . 
Second, the abandonme nt of Ame rica's isola tionist traditions and 
the cons e qu ent m erging of the military and diplomatic sphe r es of concern 
in such commitme nts as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Ste in's 
third r e ason i s the fru s tr a tion of the stal e mate in· Korea, "ne ithe r victory 
nor d e f e at, 11 which continu e s to trouble Am e rican military l ead e rs, 
particularly in comparison with Vi e tNam. 8 
Whateve r the r eason s , the professional military officer of the 
8. Harold Ste in, e d., Ame rican Civil-Milita ry D ec isions (Tu scaloo sa : 
Uni ve rsit y of A l a b a m a Press for the Twenti e th C e ntury Fund, 





·present finds him.se lf .in consultation with civilians on the military 
aspects of for eign policy. The political side of American military 
l eadership is describe d as follows by Rob e rt A . Lovett, former 
Secr etary of D e f e nse: 9 
The primary function of caree r military offic e rs in 
nationa l policyrnaking, apart from their obvious 
administrative, staff and command responsibility, is 
tha t of advising on military policies and of pr e paring 
d e taile d strategic plans as part of the complex of 
spe cialized advice from which an ave rall national 
policy can b e evol ve d. 
The asc e ndency of military considerations and military advisors 
1n the formulation of Ame rican foreign policy has again raised the 
spectre of that cr e aky fantasy, 11the military mind. II A l though civilian 
control of the military establishment in the United State s has neve r be e n 
mor e cornple t e , opposition to military d ecision-making continues . Th e 
mo st serious criticisms of the "military mind" app e ar to b e of a lle g e d 
t endencies toward : ( 1) r igidity in thought and problem analysis ; the 
r e j ection of n ew idea s and r e liance on tradition rather than l essons 
l earne d from rec e nt exp e ri e nce; ( 2 ) inade quate weighing of nonmilitary 
factor s, and inabili ty to unde rstand comple x politico-military r e l a tion-
ships; ( 3 ) an authoritarian approach to most social issues and situations, 
accompani e d by di s r esp ect for and disregard of civilian authority; ( 4 ) 
insulation from nonmilitary knowle dg e and anything b e yond what is 
narrow ly d e fin e d as militarily relevant; ( 5 ) judgment of policy goals and 
9. Lovett, Readings in the Making of Am e rican Fore ign Policy, 






. technique s prima_rily ~n terms of military forc e and military strate gy . 
In fact, according to Walte r Millis, "the 'military mind' .. . 
did not s ee m, whe n it reache d the highe st l evels of responsibility and 
authority, to b e markedly diffe r e nt from the diplomatic or l e gal or 
busines s mind . " 11 
Because the American p e ople still distrustthe military, there is 
concern over the possibility of the military elite undermining, by virtue 
of growth in pow e r, control by civilian authority. Constitutionally . and 
traditiona lly this is a "straw man" as far as Ame rican political realities 
are conce rned . Since the immediate danger of a "Communist monolith" 
seems to have abate d over the past f e w years, only extr e m e anti - military 
fring e groups fea'r the prospect of sacrificing political l ibe rty to obtain 
security against communism. 
Still, the spectre of "militarism" has l ong had .its effe ct on 
American dome stic politics , and has b ee n a pote nt influe nce in blocking 
the str e ngth and d e velopme nt of our arme d forc e s. 12 Much of this 
feeling can be trace d to the old fronti e r indepe nde nc e of the nineteenth 
10. Burton M. Sapinand Richard C. Snyder, The Rol e of the 
Military in Ame rican For e ign Policy (Garde n City, N . Y. : 
D ouble day, 1954), pp . 19-20 . 
11 . Walte r Millis, with Harve y C. Mansfield and Harold Ste in, 
Arms and the State (New York : Twenti e th C e ntury Fund, 
1958 ) , pp . 140 - 141. 
12. C . Jo seph B e rna do and Euge n e H. Bacon,· Am e rican Military 
Policy (Harri s burg : The Military Se rvic e Publishing Company, 




c entury, and to t h e nascent isolationism that r emains a factor in n a tiona l 
politic s . . The autocracy of m ili t ary organi zation and the absolute right 
of s e niority is contraste d with d emocratic procedure r e lying on popula r 
consent. A c tually, Ame rica's military l ead e rs h ave never dispute d 
the ir subordination to civil authority . 
In f a ct, the r e is no question tha t th e civilian elected officials of the 
gove rnme nt exe rcis e absolute control over the military. Three major 
d e v i ces of control are at the dispos a l of the civilian administrative· 
authorities: budge t control, the a llocation of missions and r esponsibilities 
to th e various se rvices , and the r esp ons ibility of civil ian l eade rs in the 
military es tabli shme nt to advis e the Pres ide nt a nd t h e Sta t e D e partment 
on the military aspects of inte rnational r e l a tion s . 
Walte r Millis gives an accurate account of the current s ituation in 
th k . f f . 1" 13 . _e ma 1ng o or e1gn po 1cy: 
. · .. it 1s not the milita ry men w ho de tern~ine the 
ba s ic structure of our military d e f e ns e , nor is it 
the civi l ian public, the ci vilian e ditors, the 
civilians in C ongress, none of whom is any longe r 
allowe d to know enough about the vital d a t a to exe rt 
much influence on the course of policies b ase d · 
upon them .. .. the power resi d e s , not i n the 
uniforme d officers, but in the civ ilian and 
pol iti cal appointees of the Administration ~ - the 
Secre t a ries of State and D e fense , the ir nume rous 
Assistant S e cr e tari es and s t aff men, the 
Sec r e t a ry of the Treas ury and Director of t h e 
Budget , the White Hou se Special Ass i stant s , the 
Cha irman of the Atomic Ene rgy C 01nmiss i on, the 
Director of D e f e ns e Mobiliza tion a nd many mor e . 






Given the constitutional and traditiona l bas e s for civilian control 
of the military, the re is an additiona l factor -- the attitude of the offic e r 
corps toward authority . There is a strong fe e ling among officers to 
keep the profe ssional military e thic fr ee of tarnish from politics. This 
produces some strain, as th e ne e d to fulfill a creative rol e in national 
policy is recogniz e d by military l e ade rs. The r e for e the military puts a 
good d e al of faith in the dedication and sincerity of its civilian superiors . 
Military officers believe . that their advice is nec es sary in the formulation 
of national policy and that it will b e hone stly con side r e d by the civilian 
d ecision-ma k e rs. 
The rationale of civilian control is expres s e d by Harry L. C ole s 
as follows: 14 
It r e sts on two forces of un e qual str e ngth : 
a long historical heritage bas e d on fear of 
usurpa tion and tyranny, and a logical a_na lysi s 
of the relationship b e t wee n forc e and societ y. 
By far the stranger of the s e in sha ping Anglo-
Ame ric a n attitudes is the lib e ral, anti-military 
tradition. By far th e more rele vant unde r 
pre s e nt conditions is the logical conc ept of the 
primacy of politics in the affairs of s tate s. 
The r e is a danger in tight civilian control of the military that is 
seldom discuss e d by political writ e rs, and never m e ntione d publicly by 
the milita ry. Thi s is th e dange r tha t military office r s might b e come 
politically dominate d, and the ir profes sional sta nda rds subordinate d to 
partisan con s ide r a tions. The J a ckson Subcommi t tee on National S e curity 
14. H a rry L. Cole s, ed ., Tota l W a r and Cold War (Columbus: Ohio 




and Inte rnational Op e rations of the S e nat e Committee on Gove rnment 
Opera tions presente d the problem cle arly in a memorandum prepared 
in 1965. The . memorandum r e f e rr e d to "a gr e at national tradition 
which has s e rve d us well, 11 that military and foreign service officers 
should constitute inde pende nt, non- political profe ssional corps' fr ee of 
political domination in th e pres e ntatio~ of the ir views, not only within 
the exe cutive branch but also befor e Congressional committe es. 15 The 
J ?.ckson Subcommitte e, r e alizing that military offic e rs owe allegiance 
to their Commande r in Chi e f, and to the policy d e ci s ions s e t down by his 
appointe d administrators in the exe cutive branch, wants the military to 
give candid professional opinion w h e n calle d to appe ar b e for e Congr e s-
sional committee s. 
This imposes quite a strain on the individuals_ concerned, 
particularly whe n an offic e r's personal opinion or the opinion of his 
service js at odds with any Administration policy. The 'probl e m is b e st 
illustrate d by the "r e volt of the Admirals" i n 1949 w hen the Navy w e nt 
all out in support of its supe rcarri e r, cancelle d by the Secre tary of 
Defense in favor of the Air Forc e ' s controversial B-36 bombe r. Although 
the Navy was l a ter vindicated by the Kor e an War, Admiral Louis E. 
D enfie ld, Chi e f of Naval Ope rati on s , was disini s se d by Preside nt Truman 
15. U.S . Congre ss, S e n a t e , Comm itte e on G ove rnm e nt Op e r a tion s , 
C onduct of N a tional S e curity Policy, Initia l M e morandum 
pre pare d by th e Sub c om m i ttee. on National S e curi ty and Inte r-
national Ope ration s , 89th Cong., lst s e s s . (Washington: 




and f o r ce d i n t o r e ti r'e n1.ent. 
In spit e of the s tr aine d l oyalties r e f e rr e d t o a bove , an d unofficia l 
but e v e r-threat ening d a n ger s to an offi ce r' s caree r tha t might come from 
spe aking out, · the s e par a tion of p owe r s b e twee n the E xecutive a nd 
Con gre s s does a llow s ome m a n e uve ring by m i lita ry s p ok esmen. These 
possibiliti e s w ill b e explor e d in a l ate r cha pte r . 
The r e quirement by Congress for frank a n d hones t opinion from 
the rnilita ry i s expresse d i n the J ack s on Sub c 01n mittee m e morandum : 16 
The ability of Cong r ess t o avail it se lf of exact 
informa tion and hones t t estim on y is es se nti a l to 
it s inte lli g e nt a ppr a is a l of n a tional proble m s ' 
to it s e n actme nt of w i se l egis l a tion, t o th e 
discha r ge of it s con s tituti ona l r espon sibility 
for fin a n cial control of the f e d e r a l budg e t --
includin g th e d e f e n se budge t -- a nd, al s o, to m a k e 
it p o s s ible fo_r Congressiona l s tudy and d e b a t e to 
b e a cons t r uctive e l e 1nent i n the e duc a tion of the 
Ame rican p e ople . 
. 
The e nd of World W a r II foun d the Unite d Sta t es the s trange st 
nation in the wor l d -- politically, milita rily and econom ically. The 
evolution of E a st- W es t polari zation in the "cold war" and the continuing 
central role of the Unite d Sta t es in the w ide ning s p ectrum of warfar e 
establi s h e d the fu n dame nta l inte rde p e nde n ce ofit s for eign and milita ry 
policies . No longe r i s milita ry powe r m e r e l y an " ext e n s ion" of for eign 
policy; ina d e qu ac ies in nationa l milita ry s tr e n gth m a y make it difficult 
16 . Ibid., p. 7. 
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or impossibl e to_ follow certain courses of foreign policy . 17 The inte r-
relation of foreign policy and military policy is suggeste d by some of the 
curr ent major problem areas in Ame ri can for eign poli c y : the military 
and political future of NATO; the statu s of B erlin; the hope for an 
equitable solution i n Vie t Nam; arms control and disarmament; and 
milita ry assistance progran1s in unde rdeve lop e d nations . 
Mor e explicite ly, effective u se of military t echniques and military 
doctrine depends on direction and coordination from a general fram ework 
of for eign policy - - military poli c i es must -not b e come e nd s in themse lves . 
· Fore ign poli cy is supe rior to military policy in that military considerations 
"mu st not d etermine what national objectives are appropriate . To success-
fully a ttain the g'o a l s d e t ermine d through policy decisions, for e ign policy 
and military policy must be coordinated. 18 
The ultimate test of America's rnilitary es t a bli shment, the r efo r e , 
is how well it se rves our for e ign policy . l9 Th e military has become 
more aware of thi s asp ec t of modern military professionalism . Offic e r 
training i s expanding b eyond th e t echni ca l to i ncl ude inte rnationa l 
r e l a tions and politi cal science, to e nable th e military to contribute more 
17. Burton M. Sa pin, The Making of United States Fore ign P olicy 
(N ew York: Fr ederick A . Praeger, 1966}, p, 135. 
18. S a pin and Snyder, Th e Role of the Military in American Fore ign 
Poli cy, p. 9. 
19. Adam Y a rmolin sky, The United Sta t es Military Powe r and 
Foreign Policy, The University of Chicago C enter for Poli cy 
Study ( Chicago: U n ivers ity of Chicago, 1967), p. 8. 
.. 
2. 1 
sub s tantially to foreign policy d e cision-making. A naval officer made 
this point in a profes sional s e rvice rnagazine : "Fore ign policy making 
at the highest l e v e l is and will continue to b e a major --pe rhaps in 
time the major -- pr e occupation of th e arme d forces. 20 
United State s for e ign policy and military policy hav e b een drawn 
toge the r s ince World War II into a new classification -- "national 
security policy." This is a . multifac e t e d enterpris e of gr e at comple xity, 
with the ultimate purpose of fulfilling the vital inte r e sts of the Unite d 
States in a hos t ile world. Milita ry strate gy is no longe r d e vised to 
· merely carry out national policy. The distinction b e tw e en the two has 
been virtually eliminate d. D e cisions forme rly left to the military - -
choices about w e apons sy s t e m .s and force l e v e ls, as w e ll as contingency 
planning-- ar e matte rs of fundam e nta l conce rn for for eign policy makers. 
Military participation in foreign pol icy d e cisions ha s progress e d from 
m e rely giving military "advice" whe n asked, and the n stoically acting 
on th e r e sultant civilian d e cisions, to participa tion of military l e ade rs 
rn the d e cis i on-ma king proce ss . 
For e ign policy which ign ores military pow e r cannot b e e ffe ctive . 
It is equally true that foreign policy constrict~ d by pre f e r e nc e s for ide al 
military conditi on s is fruitle s s and short- sighted . Th e n e cessity for a 
continuing seri e s of l ess than optirnal choic e s .is now wide ly recognized 
by both military and civilian l e ade rs. 
20. L e rche , U.S , Nava l In s titut e Procee dings, July, 1964, p . 70. 
' 
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The amalgamation of fo:J;eign policy and m .ilitary strategy into 
nationa l security policy ha s r esulted in more civilian influence in 
milita ry d ecisions, and gr eat e r milita ry contributions to d ecisions in 
the area of "for e ign policy." This la s tde v e l opment causes anti-military 
element s in the country to ov e rlook th e r ealities of civilian control of 
the milita ry, b e li e ving that Am e r i can for e ign p o licy is a l most tota lly 
conditioned by the cold wa r and a l most totally subordinated to military 
c t:ms ide r a tions. 21 
Th e r e is a r eal problem involve d in the ri sing milita ry voice 1n 
· foreign policy. In the military, policy is . ins e parable from program. 
In the civilian politi cal sphe r e , policy too. often b e comes a substitute 
for program. 22 Civilian statesn<en too ofte n f ee l that a proble m will 
solve it se lf once a policy h as b een d e t e rmine d, and _may ove rlook .the 
d e tail s of action n ece ssary to e x ecute the policy. Military solutions on 
the other h a nd m a y b e n ecessa rily short:..range, d e f e nsive and time -
buying, ob sc uring the ne e d for a d e t a ile d, long -range, non-military 
progra m. Thi s problem can arise in c risis situa tions, when often the 
oply ava ila ble solution to a proble m will b e present e d by the milita ry, 
with it s prope nsity for d e t a ile d contingency plans and the ability to bring 
enormous r es our ces to b ea r in a short time . The civilian l ead e r ship 
21. John M. Swoml ey , The Military Esta bli shme nt (B oston: B eac on 
Press, 19 64 ), p. 138. 
22. Yarmolin s ky, The United Sta t es Milita ry Powe r and Fore ign 
Policy , p. 22. 
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may thus b e forc e d to giv e a program to the milita ry rne r e ly b ecaus e 
the military can execute decision s and marshall forc es more rapidly 
than civilian agencies . This may b e true even wh e n both the military 
and the civil ians agree that it would b e pre f e rable that th e military not 
be given the respon s ibility . 
T h e re are some positive aspects to the military approach to 
for e ign pol icy d ecis ion - making . The military traditionally emphasizes 
the n e c ess ity of solving problem.s, rathe r than m e r e ly enduring their 
cons e qu en c es ; civil ian politicians t e nd to de_lay commitme nt until onl y 
· one cours e of action is f ea sibl e, thus avoiding p e rsonal r e sponsibil ity 
for the conseque nc es . The military requires tha t d e cisions mu s t b e 
operational , that. making the d ecision is not enough to bring d e sir e d 
r esults. F inally , military offic e rs have no political bas e through 
e l ections or appointme nts ; their fi r st l oyalties l ie with th e nation and 
their service. Military p e r s onne l are more abl e to p l ace national 
i nteres t above p e rsonal , group, regional or party concerns . 
On the n e gative side , military d ecisions ar e b es t made to d e vis e 
methods to r each already stipulate d ob j e ctives , but the d e ci sian-making 
p roc e ss is l ess facil e i n the r e l ated tasks of sele cting national goals and 
d e fining for e ign policy obj ectives . There is a strong t e ndenc y to search 
for doctrinal standard r esponses to an unknown v a ri e ty of circurns tan ces . 23 
In e val uating the e ff ect of military d e cision - making on for e ign 
23. L e rche , U . S . N aval Ins titute Procee dings, July, 1964:, pp . 72 - 74. 
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policy, Morris J an owi t z present s t w o the ories on how milita1·y force 
should b e us e d to achieve pol iti cal obj e ctives . T h e first i s labe l e d the 
"ab s olute " do c trine and r e flects th e tra ditiona l , simplistic approach to 
problem - sol ving . Tho se of the absolute school see warfare - - actual or 
thre ate n e d as the fundam e ntal b as i s of international r e l ations . The r e -
for e , th e mor e comple t e th e vic tory in warfare, the gr eat e r the po s si -
bility of achieving political goa l s. In short, the r e is no substitute for 
"total victory . " The inade quacy of this doctrine was prove d by the Col d 
War, and confirme d by the Kor ean War, the C uba n missil e c r isis, an·d 
the war in Viet Nam. J anowitz ' "pragma tic 11 school emphasizes the 
Tevolutionary character of atomic e n ergy, and t h e discontinuity of the 
milita ry p as t with the futur e . T he pra g1na tists see warfa r e as but one 
instrument of inte rna tional r e lations , inexorabl y combine d with th e 
ideol o g ical and ec onomic struggle . 2 4 
Military influe nc e on foreign policy is exerted in two way s --
through the administrative cha nne l s of th e Exec utive , via the se r vice 
s e cr e t a ri e s and the Joint Chi e fs · of Staff, ·and through C ongres s and 
extra-governmental channe l s by m ean s of the "milita ry l obby . 11 The 
basic purpo se of this pape r i s to exp l or e the Navy ' s influence on for e ign 
pol icy throu gh congressional committees. Th e N a vy's e fforts will b e 
explore d i,r;_ d e pth in subsequent chapters . The following p a ragr a phs 
will deal bri e fly with the general import of se rvic e l obb ying. 
24 . J anowitz, The Professi onal Soldi e r, p . 264 . 
.. 
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"Lobbying" as carried out by the military differs substantially from the 
lobbying practices of industry and othe r speCial inte rest groups. The 
military's e ffort is more accurately d es cribe d as publi c r e l ations, 
since th e military h as no political bas e from which to ope rate and neithe r 
d e sire nor means to bring political pr e s sure on Congress. 
Opinions on th e ext e nt and effectiveness of the military lobb y vary. 
Walter Milli s b e lieve d that "the arme d s e rvices had never b ee n a 
politica l force of any consequence in the ms e l ves" y e t th e officer 
corps of the services "unavoidably constitute d inte r e st groups, each 
supporte d by pow e rful private industrial inte r es ts. 112 5 It should b e 
realiz e d tha t the r e is no d evious connection b e t ween the military and 
industry, in spite of Pr e side nt Eis enhow e r's warnings about the 
"military- indu s trial complex . 11 The arms industr>:" is in the busine ss 
of s e lling arms, and tri e s to anticipate or even precipitate the ne e ds of 
the various services. Eve n r e tir e d military offic e r s are pr e vente d by 
f ederal l aw from lobbying on beha lf of industry. 
Senator Richard B. Rus se ll, Chairman of the S e nate Arme d Forces 
Committee , apparently do es not agree with e ither Millis or Pre s ide nt 
Eis e nhow e r. H e told a N ew York Times reporter, "the arme d services 
do not h ave unions. The y do not have l egislative r epresentatives in 
Wa shington. The y are una ble to lobb y among membe rs of Congress . " 2 6 
25. Walte r Millis, Arms and M e n (New York: C apricorn Books, 
1956), p. 306 . 
26. C. P. Trus se ll, article in the N ew York Times , July 10, 196 4, p. J. 
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The Senator i s correct, in the narrow definition of lobbying, but the 
milit a ry does maintain clo se and contini.ling contact with Congress 
through legi s lative liai son offic e rs, to provide whatever infonnation 
and assistance is possible . The se rvices ar e anxious to fo ster 
attitudes in Congress and th e public at large which are favorabl e to 
their programs . 
Just as important as the services ' public relations effo rts are 
appearances of military personne l b efo r e congressional committees 
to answer ques tion s. These appea rances are bas e d on something more 
explicit than the public's "right to know." Congress is r esponsible 
under th e Constitution for raising and supporting the arme d forc es . 
Not only th e a rmed services and appropriations committees are in-
valved in l egislation concerning the military. The government 
ope rations committee s concern themse lves with the administrative 
efficiency of the services; the aeronautical and space science commit-
tees oversee the space program s ; the judiciary committees watch 
military poLicies and practices in the field of individual rights; the 
for e ign relations committees ar e concerned with military pow e r as an 
element of for e ign policy; the Po s t Offic e and Civil S e rvic e committees 
obs e rve practices affecting civilian employees; and the Joint Atomic 
Energy and Joint D e f e n se Procurement committe es exe rcis e self-
evident inte r e st 1n d e f e ns e programs. 2 7 
27 . Jack R aymond , Power a t the P e ntagon (N ew York: Harpe r & 
Row, 1964), pp. 201-202. 
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Much of the t estimony of service p e rsonnel b e for e the committees 
i s present e d as "personal opinion, 11 to avoid th e s ugges tion of disloyalty 
if the y are m conflict with Administration policy. Many of the question s 
28 
ar e worked out in advance with cooperative Congressmen . In any 
cas e , answ e rs to Congre ss iona l qu estions are candidly intended to 
influ ence l egislation; and carefully phra se d to advance service vi ew -
points . RobertS. McNamara's tour as $ ec r e t a ry of Defense has 
~rought a bout more emphasis on D epa rtment of Defense programs by 
military s pokesmen , and f ewe r parochia l views of individual services . 
This has come about p a rtly through McNama r a 1 s firm control of the 
services, but mainly through the Planne.d Program Budge t Syste m 
through which Congress is asked to consider D e f e ns e D e partment 
systems which cut across individua l service r espons ibiliti es . Also, 
military security procedures normally insure tha t tho se officers who 
testify b e for e committees ar e not like l y to pr e sent opinions sub stan -
tially different fro1n D e fense De partment policy . 
In spite of Sec retary McNamara 1 s e ffective clamp on potentially 
?utspoken military l ead e rs, th e services 1 burgeoning public r e lations 
and l egislative li a ison progra1ns cause some uneasiness in thos e 
obs e rve r s sensitive to the remote possib ility of unwant e d military 
influence in national politics . A ccor ding to Profe ssor Huntington, the 
de dining thr eat of a Sovie t Union- United State s nucl e ar confrontation 
28. Ibid . , p. 203 . 
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cau se d weakening of the ext ern a l requiren1ents shaping the siz e and 
char acter of th e a r me d forc es ; the i m p act of domestic con s ide rations 
and the pressu r es of indu s tria l, r e gional a nd popular groups in influe ncing 
policy increase d. 29 
The n ew public r e l a tions pur s u e d by the services is seen as 
pote ntially thr eat e ning the sys t e m of political b a l ance . "An organ 
of gove rnment lobbying on its o wn b e h a lf -- esp eci a lly one w hi c h 
d eal s with s u ch a vita l fun c tion -- i s diffic ult to contain," according 
to Morri s J anowitz . 30 The se f ears are un~ounde d, as professional 
milita ry offic e rs ar e e ffectiv e ly containe d by thei r civilian sup e riors, 
-and by the ir ow n i1na g e of th e milita ry as b eing 11 a bove p olitic s ." 
29. S amue l P. Huntington, e d., Changing P a tt e rn s of Military 
Politics, p. 14. 
30. Janowitz , The Profe ssional Soldier, p . 392 . 
CHAPTER III 
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
Ame rica n n a val policy from the R e volutiona ry War to the l a t e 
nine t eenth century was sta tic, emphas i z ing cornmerce raiding and 
local coastal d e f e n se . Although p e riodic e fforts w e re m a d e to e xpa nd 
Ame rican nava l powe r, th e y we re d e f eat e d by d e sire for e conomy in 
governme nt spe ndi ng and f e ar s that the ext e n s ion of Am e rican milita ry 
pow e r o ve rs eas w ould involv e the country in Europe an political 
. t . 1 1n r1gues . Both comme rc e raiding and coa s t a l d e fe ns e w e r e e ss e ntial 
to any sys t e m of naval s tra t e gy , but n e ithe r was in it se lf ade qu a t e to 
cope with s itua tions in which a maritime nation might b e come involve d. 2 
The exp a n s ion of naval forc e s in ship s a nd m e n during the Civil War 
mere ly g a v e the Navy an incre as e d blockading and crui se r capability, 
and th e end of the w ar found the s e rvi c e r e turning to ob s curity. 
The "New N a vy" b e g a n to e volve in the 1880 1 s, whe n it was 
reali ze d tha t Ame rican n a val powe r r es t e d in ob s ole t e ship s and 
l. Harold and Mar ga r e t Sprout, The Ri se of Ame rican Nava l 
Pow e r, 177 5- 1918 (P r ince ton: Prince t on Unive rsity Pr e s s , 
1939), pp. 38-62. 
2. H a rold an d M a rga r e t Sprout, Toward a N e w Orde r of S ea 
Powe r: Am e ri can N aval Policy and the World S ce n e , 191 8 -




ine ffective organization. A new cla ss of crui se rs was authorized 
by Congress in 1883, which would at l east provide a transition b e tween 
. . . . . 
th e old wooden s hip s still in service, and armored vessels w ith modern 
gun systems b eing d eve lope d in Europ e . Eve n new equipment would b e 
ine ffective, how e v e r, as long as the doctrin e called for stopping an 
enem y at the coast. The ancient strategic ideas of most of the Navy ' s 
senior offic e rs, some of whom still b e li eve d that no ship should b e 
built without rigging for sails, were shared by members of Congress . 
The re was strong support in Washington for limiting ship d es ign to 
fast, comme rc e -raiding cruise rs and immobile , h eavily-armore d 
. monitor s for harbor d efens e . These doctrinal . concepts were strengthened 
by th e country's. g eographica l and politica l isola tion, which would lim it 
Ame rica n effo rts to th e Western H emisphe r e . 3 
A "revolution" in naval strategic doctrine was in th e offing when 
Captain Alfred Tha y e r Maha n assumed duti es on the faculty of the n ew 
Nava l W a r College in N ewport, Rhode Island, ope n e d the previous yea r 
by R ea r Admiral Ste phen B. Luc e . Mahan would have tr emendous 
influe n ce on thinking within the naval service, an.d would b e championed 
by th e eme rging 11i1nperialist 11 politician s The odore Roos evelt and 
Henry Cabot Lodge . M ahan argued for centralization of naval forc es 
to p e rmit the Unite d Sta t es to m ee t a thr eat ening for ei gn naval forc e 
far from American shores in d ecisive fl ee t engagement s . 




Mahan·' s call for centr a lization of naval organi z ation and 
ope rations of the fl ee t m e t r e sistanc e both in the N a vy and in Congr e ss . . 
Opposition from his fellow offic e r s came from th e insti nctive ly a nti -
inte lle ctual "Old Gua rd" who assum e d that a n e ffici e nt n a v a l offic e r 
by d e finition was not an inte llectual. Mahan's quit e resp e cta ble 
techn ica l skill s a nd s e amanship w e r e unfairly criticized, particularly 
afte r his books on naval hi s tory and sea pow e r b e came popular in 
Europe , and l a t e r in his ow n country. 4 Mahan's criticism of th e N a vy ' s 
organi z ational d e c e ntrali zation was strongl y r es i s t e d by th e h eads of the 
virtua lly autonomous 11bureaus 11 through which the bu s ine ss of the 
service was conducte d. 
The primary oppone nts of centrali z ation outside the Navy w e r e 
loc a t e d in Congr e ss . During the nine t eenth c e ntury, naval appropri -
ations w e r e r e g a rde d mainly as a p a rticularly u seful and attractive 
form of the "pork b a rr e l. " An e xc e ssive numbe r of shipyards wer e. 
maintaine d, to build and m a intain n a vy s hips at ine ffici ent costs . 
Congr e ssme n and S e nators w ere l o a th to give up the s e exc e lle nt m e ans 
for putting g o ve rnme nt mone y into the ir con s titu_e nci e s. Harold a nd 
Margar e t Sprout giv e the follow ing d e scription of the politic s plaguing 
the Navy up to World W a r I in The Ri se of Am e rica n N a v a l Powe r. 5 
4. Rob e rt Bre nt, Capta in, U.S. Navy, "Ma ha n - Marine r or 
Misfit?," U.S. Nava l Insti tute Procee din gs, Vol. 92, No . 4, 
April, 1966, pp. 9 3-10 3 . 





For reasons · inhe r e nt in its structure and composition, 
Congress but rar e ly took a national vi ew of naval 
defens e . . . . the constitutiona l separation of 
. pow e rs rais e d serious obstacles against 
exe cutive initia tive and l eade rship . 
. . . To popularize the Na vy in the different 
sections of the country, and to secure the 
congre ss ional votes n eces sary to pass naval 
appropriations, it early became the established 
practice to distribute naval appointments, contracts, 
and othe r spoils as widely as possible. At b es t . .. 
. naval d eve lopme nt was correlated with inte rnational 
obj e ctive s in spite of patronage and th e pork 
barrel. At worst, national interes ts and policies 
were lost to sight in a sordid congressional scramble 
for spoils .... Political strategy rather than naval 
strate gy too ofte n dicta t e d the location of navy yards 
.and oth e r works. Oversea bas es wer e chronically 
neglect e d, large ly, it would appea r, b ecaus e 
the insular pass e s sions had no congressional 
votes with which to barga in. Unde r su.ch a system 
the A1ne rican people might have th e most expensive 
navy, but it was certain that they would neve r have 
as good a n av y as the steadily rising financial outlay 
might h ave l e d them to exp ect. 
Although the imple mentation of Mahan 1 s strategic innovations 
was generally obstructe d by political isolationists and economy drive s, 
his writings had lasting influe nc e on naval strate gists up to World 
War II. Officer l ead e rship in the Navy from The odore Rooseve lt 1 s 
preside ncy throu gh the doldrum s ofthe 1920 1 s and 1930 1 s at l e ast 
adhe red to Mahan 1 s ideals, although th e y were not given the forces to 
reali ze his doctrine . 
Ad1niral Mahan 1 s first and most influentia l book was The Influence 
of S ea Pow e r upon History, 1660-17 8 3, publishe d in Bo s ton in 1890. 
In essen ce , Mahan 1 s interpretation of history was im.p e rialistic and 
mercantalistic . His book was bas e d on the si1nultaneous rise of th e 
_.. 
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British Navy and th e British Empir e . To Mahan, expansion was the 
essence of national greatness , a concept shared by" Theodor e Roos evelt, 
Henry C abot Lodge, and their fellow precipitators of the Spanish-Am e rican 
War. To support expansion, a country must accumulate wealth; Mahan 
s_aid, and a flourishing foreign commerc e was the surest means. To 
compete s-uccessfully for marke ts, a nation must have a large and 
flourishing m e rchant marine, which in turn would contribute to the 
nation's wealth by carrying othe r nation's goods . To protec t the 
merchant marine, the nation must have a sttong navy to protect its 
merchant shipping and overseas colonies to provide safe havens abroad . 
The navy would protec t th e s ea appr.oaches to the mother country and 
the colonies, and the colonies in turn would provide b ase s and stations 
for the navy ov e rs eas .6 
To effectively carry out his the ory of national powe r through 
sea power, Mahan develope d a fundamenta l principle : the doctrine 
of concentra tion of pow e r. In its appli e d form this became the 
doctrine of battle -flee t supremacy. Mahan concluded that the greatest 
threat to Ame rican security would come from an enem-y battle fleet 
thr eatening our shores ; to in sure safety of the country, the Unite d 
States should maintain a fl ee t of capital s hips, at l eas t as strong as 
the strongest potenti a l enerny. H e recornmended separate fl eets for 
the Atlantic and Pacific, with the necessary bases and shipyards to 
6 . Sprout, Towa rd a N ew Orde r of S ea Powe·r, pp . 9-10. 
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support them. Mahan singled out the national b a ttl e fle e t as the 
ultimate form of powe r, and saw srnaller or mor e diversified units 
as unnecessary except as the y contribute d to the survival of the 
battleship . 7 
Mahan's doctrines were eventually adopte d by the United States 
N avy, although h e was honor e d in his own service sometime afte r 
the enthusiastic rec e ption his writings received in Europe . Ame rican 
naval offic e rs came to see the Navy as the country ' s 11f.irst l ine of · 
defens e , 11 and its primary mission as "cominand of the sea 11 through 
d estruction of the enemy's fleet. 8 · 
B e fore the Navy coul d succes -sfully implement their new 
strategic doctrine , a numbe r of int e rnal reforms were n ecessary 
that prove d difficult to attain. The Gen~ ral Board, established in 
19 00, was to give th e S ec r e tary of th e Navy profess ional advice in 
st r at egic planning. The Boa rd had no control ove r the actual adminis-
tration of the Navy, which was handle d through the bureaus through 
World War II. President The odor e Roosevelt tri e d to centralize 
operational control of the .service, but was generally unsuccessful. 
He did contrive to create the post Of Aide for Ope rations to the 
Secre tary, an advisor w ith no authority in the chain of command. 
Roos eve lt did assert his pow e rs as Commande r in Chief in sending 
7. Paul Y . Ham1nond, Organizing for D e fense (Prince ton : 
Prince ton Unive rsity Press, 1961 }, p. 63 . . 
8. Dav i s , The Admirals Lobby ( Chape l Hill : The University of 
North C arolina Press, 1967 }, p . 112. 
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the "Great White Flee t" around the wo rld in 1908, in the fac e of 
Congressional obj ection to the cost . Upon the r e turn ofthe fl ee t, 
howeve r, it was sca"tte r e d to the various "home " naval yards and 
bases, where equipment r e pairs and naval payrolls could b e nefit 
local interests . 9 
During the Taft adm.ini stration, the Navy's Gene ral Board 
supporte d a Council of N a tional De fense , to coordinate military a.nd 
naval policy and establish clea r national policy for both. Th e Council 
was to consist of the Secr e taries of State , yYar and N a vy, the chairmen 
of the S e nate and Hous e Military and Naval Affairs Committees , the 
.Army Chi e f of Staff, the Aide for Ope rations, and the Preside nts of 
the Army and Navy War Colleges . The Navy hop e d the Council would 
provide long r a nge policy guidance for naval policy to originate in 
the Navy; th e Army saw the Council as a m eans for central administra-
tive power to make possible the r e organization of th e Army for optimum 
effici enc y. In truth, the Navy was oppos e d to concentrating the d eci s ion-
making for military policy in the hand s of the Executiv e , and looked to 
Congress for the exe rci se of civilian control ove r th e military. 10 D is -
agre ement b e twe e n the Army and the Navy ove r the function of the 
Council, and r es istanc e w ithin the services, r es ult e d in the failure of 
th e propos a l to get anywhere with Congress. R e form e r s in th e Navy 
9. Harnmond, Organi zing for D e fense , p. 65. 
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were finally able to get the post of Chief of Naval Operation s es t a blish e d 
in th e chain of command, 11w ho, unde r th e d i r ection of the Sec r e tary of 
Navy, shall b e r esponsible for the r eadiness of th e fl ee t for war and b e 
charge d with it s g ene ral dir e ction ."ll The Navy h a d hope d th e CNO 
would provid e direct access to Congress , by-passing th e S e cretary. 
During the p e riod b e t wee n the wars th e r esponsibility and .authority of 
the Chi e f of Naval Operations incr ease d~ t o culrnina te in Admira l Ernes t 
J. King 's broad concept of the offic e in World W a r II. 
The G eneral Board r epeat edl y r ecommended increases in the size 
of the fl ee t from 1903. These r ecommenda t i on s we r e dra s tically r e duc e d 
by a Congress unconc e rne d w ith Mahan'.s doctrine .. During the first two 
years of Pr e sident Wil son ' s adm inis tration the Navy cont inu e d t o grow 
slow l y, until the "prepa r edness " campaign of 1915, whe n Pres ide nt 
Wilson seemingly ch ange d h is mind a ft e r th e Lusita ni a crisis in 
F ebruary. 12 Wil son was a ble to ov e rcom_e s trong congressiona l oppo si -
tion from proponents of a "little n avy " and on August 29, 1916, signed 
th e Naval Act of 1916 which carried through the Gene ral Boa rd' s r ecorn-
m endations, and th e service's d e sires for 11 a N avysecond to none. 1113 
In adopting Mahan's theories , the Navy possesse d an es tabli s h e d -
body of thought i t could dr aw on to justify it s annual budge t r e ques t s 
11. Ibid., p. 72. 
12. Sprout, The Ri se of Ame rican Naval Pow e r, 1775-1918, 
pp. 328-329 . 
13 . Ibid., pp. 339-340 . 
.. 
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b e fore con gr e s s. In tho se p e riods in the 19 20 1 s and 19 30 1 s whe n no 
enemy was cle arly appare nt, the M a h a n doctrine provide d the b asis 
for nava l str e ngth to m ee t a conc e ivable e n e my -- any n a tion with a 
fl e et that might thr e ate n the security of the Unite d State s or its over-
seas po s s e ssions . Additionally, the Mahan doctrine m e t three 
prer e quisite s that any strate gic the ory ha.s n ee d e d in this c entury 
if it was to g et congre ssional support: first, the promis e to m eet and 
d e feat any e n e my at a point w e ll r e mov e d from the contine ntal Unite d 
State s; se cond, the promis e to do this d e cisively and quickly; third, · 
the promi se to do it with t e chnological superiority rath e r than with 
ground troops. 14 The strate gic bombing strate gi e s of the United 
State s Air Force pre suma bly m e t the s e crit e ria after World War II, 
offe ring th e mo s t prote ction for the mone y sp e nt. 
How e v e r, M a han prove d no mat c h for the n e utralist, isolationist, 
and pacifist s e ntime nts that flourish e d afte r World War I. The 
Arne rican p e ople h a d w on 11th e war to e nd all war s ," and w e r e not 
incline d to support an e ffe ctive military forc e the r e afte r . Defe ns e 
spe nding sharply d e cline d, and would not substant ially incre as e 
until 1940 . R e duc e d d e f e n se budge ts had three main conseque nc e s 
for the Navy . F i rst, hard prioriti e s h a d to b e establishe d for ships 
and e quiprne nt, including d e ci s ions on how much mone y to sp e nd on 
such innova tion s as a i rcr a ft and s ubmarine s. S e cond, th e profe ssional 




offic e r corps su_ffered a drop in morale as they were denied the means 
to support An1e rican commitments abroad, particularly in the Pacific. 
Finally, limited appropriations forc e d rnilitary l ead ers to compe t e 
bitt e rly for the funds available. 15 Vince nt Davis b e lieves that the r e 
was strong compe tition b e tw een the Army and th e Navy for appropria -
tions; it is mor e accurate to say that each service carri e d out an 
independ ent struggle with Congress and its r es p e cti\re s e rvice 
secr e tary, as the mis s ions of the two services were b e lieve d to 
be virtually independent. Although the S e11at e and House Naval 
Affairs Committees were fairly conside rate and sympathetic toward 
the navy's reques ts, tho se offic e rs charged with naval policy and 
d e v e lopme nt f e lt tha t they only r e ques t e d what was n ecessary to main-
tain the fl ee t and th a t any r e ductions were unw arrante d. In the 
1930' s Admiral Harry E. Yarne ll answered a congressional query 
of an appropriation item by saying bluntly: "Why the h e ll wou.ld we 
put it in the r e if we didn't n ee d it? "l6 
If budge t s were not a cause of int e r-service rivalry, the 
innovation of th e airplane certainly was. Although the Army Air 
Service playe d only a limited role in World War I, Army pilots 
alr eady had vi sions of "air pow e r 11 as the ultima t e in modern warfare . 
15. Ibid., pp. 73- 74. 
16. Andrew G. N e lson, Li e utenant Commande :r, U.S. N a vy, 
"Politic s and the Naval Offic e r, 11 U.S , Naval Institute 
Pro cee ding s , Vol. 8 7, No. 9, S e pte mb e r, 1961, p. 32. 
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By 1919 Briga di e r G e n e r a l William "Billy" Mitche ll and hi s followers 
w e r e calling for autonomy for the air service, s e para t e froin th e Army. 
G e n e ral Mitch e ll wante d th e air s e r vice to control a ll milita ry aviation, 
including n aval aviation . Mitc h e ll charge d tha t th e "battleship 
admiral s 11 would never a llow any r eal progre ss in naval aviation, 
and tha t in any cas e th e airp l a n e had r end e r e d a ll surface forc es 
ob sol e t e . 17 The G e n e r a l may h a ve b een c.orrect on his fir s t point, 
but could not for esee the quantum jump in carrie r-ba sed air power 
that d eve lop e d in World War II. Most naval office rs a l so l a cke d this 
for e sight. 
Mit c h e ll carried out a concentrated public r e l ations c a mpa ign 
b eginning in 1919 with appearances b e fore the L a Guardia Subcommittee 
of the Hous e Comrnittee on Milita ry Affairs. R e presentativ e Fiorello 
L a Gua rdia of N ew York was an ea rly Congress ional propone nt of air 
power. .Nothing r es ult e d from these h ea rings but they set the stage 
for r e p eat e d congressional committee meetings a nd administrative 
cornmission s that w ould study air power ove r the n ext t wenty years. 
According to Walte r Millis: 11ln the two d e cades after 1919 the r e was 
hardly a year in which some b oard or Congressional committee was 
not sitting or r e porting on th e dilemma of air policy. 111 8 Mitch e ll 1 s 
17. Ar chiba ld B. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, H istor y of 
· Unit e d Sta t es Naval Aviation (New H aven : Yale Unive rsity 
Press , 19 49 ), pp. 176 - 17 8. 
18. W a lter Millis, Arms and Men, (New York: Capricon~ 





effort s eventually resulte d in th e Air Corp s Act of 1926, which 
enhanc e d the po s ition of the Air Corps in th e Army, and authorized 
a fiv e -yea r exp a nsion p rogram . The cr e ation of G e n e r a l H eadquarte rs 
Air For ce in 19 35 gave the Air Forc e virtual a utonomy. 
The Navy's a pproach to aviation was r e l a ti vely low -ke y. The 
army h a d take n ini tia l cognizance of th e po ssibl e milita ry applications 
of air powe r, but the N avy was too much conce rne d w ith the building 
of th e b a ttl e fl ee t to b e ove rly conc e rne d. G ene r a l Mitche ll ' s ca~paign 
to control all of military air did pr e cipitate some action by the Navy, 
. r es ulting in the forming of th e Bu.reau of Aeronautics in 1921 and the 
commissioni ng of the first aircraft -- USS LAN GLEY, a converte d 
colli e r --in 1922 . Nava l aviation continu e d to grow during the n ext 
two d ecades , and new applic a tions of aviation t q sea powe r would b e 
deve lop e d. None the l ess , it was not until P earl H arb o r in 1941 tha t 
th e Navy fully r eali ze d th e po ssibiliti e s of c arrie r-launch e d a ir powe r. 
World War II was to prove th e wor th of carrier aviation as the m ain 
striking arm of the fl ee t, and the final d emis e of the b attleship as 
ultima t e in naval powe r. 
The running controversy over miiitary aviation was r enewe d 
after W orld War II. Thi s ques tion, nominally an int e r servic e argume nt 
ov e r the control of ai rpowe r , i s p a rt of the larger issue of military 
unifi cati on which e merge d shortly a ft e r the Spanish -Ame rican War. 
The fir st propo sal s for milita r y unifica tion came from r e form e rs 





The military was us e d as an e x a rnpl e of l ack of coordination of pla nning 
and e ffort . The unification driv e ab a t e d sornewh a t unti l afte r World 
War I, when C ongr e ss conside r e d a numbe r of unifi cation bill s 
b e tw een 1921 and 19 26. The r e vival of the unifi c ation controve rsy 
stemme d primarily frorn Mitch e ll' s campa ign for a sepa rate ai r 
forc e . Both the Army. and the Navy strongl y and su c c essfully fought 
broa d r e organi zation of th e s e r vic e s, f e aring lo ss of ide ntity and 
r e j ecting the the ory tha t military forc e s fulfill simi l a r functions. I n 
spite of a spate of Congr e s s ional he aring~, pr opone nts of mili tary 
unifi c a tion could not intere st e nough congr e s s m e n in military 
r e orga ni z ation during the boom- bust p e riod b e tw ee n the Wor ld Wars, 
and the unification qu e stion w ould b e dormant until l a t e in World 
War II. 
Low budge ts and a battle ship ori e nte d strate gy w e r e two factors 
inhibiting the Navy's d e v e lopme nt during the int e rwar p e riod, but 
the y w e r e only smalle r parts of the ove rall American attitude toward 
for eign policy. G e orge F . K e nna n wrote in Am e rica n Diplomacy, 
1900- 19 50 that A m e ric an diploma cy ove r thes e ·y e ars was characte ri ze d 
by a s e lf-righte ous and "unsha k e ab l e b e li e f tha t, if our principles 
w e r e comme nda ble , the ir con se que nc es could not b e othe r than 
h appy and acc e ptabl e . But rar e l y could w e b e l ur e d into a discussion 
of the r eal quant i ti e s involve d . . . . " 19 The Wa shington N a va l 
19. G e orge F. K e nna n , Ame ric a n Di p l oma cy, 1900 -1950 (N e w 
York: N e w Ame r ican Library "Me ntor" p a p e rba ck, 19 60 ), p . 45. 
Confere nce of 1922 wa s pop ul a rly haile d as a great s t e p towa rd 
di sar mam.e nt and w orld p ea c e , as was the ine ffe ctive K e llogg-Bria nd 
Pac t of 1928 w hi ch m a d e wa r "ille g a l." These tr e nd s put the 
milita ry in a n outrage ou s l y a mb i guous po s ition -- milita ry offic e rs 
found the rnse lve s in existe n ce f o r a purpo se that the e n tir e thrust 
o f U.S; for e ign policy h as typic a lly di savowe d . 20 Mor e pre ci se ly, 
the a priori r e j ection of the us e of forc e r e sulte d in an a lmo s t 
com ple t e exclu s ion of the milita ry d e p a rtment s , the i r c ivilia n a nd 
uniforme d h e ad s alike , from the formula tion of nationa l policy 
during th e 1930 ' s . 2 1 
This unfortuna t e circumsta n ce d e v e l op e d in spit e of the l e ssons 
l e arn e d durin g World W a r I of the importa nc e of coordina t i ng mil itary 
pla nning with for e i gn poli c y. 22 In fact, the se r vi ces did not l ea rn 
to e ffecti ve l y coordin a t e p l an s a nd policies until World War II 
made coop e r a tion es s e ntia l for survival. Both s e rvice s l ooke d to 
the Sta t e D e p a rtme nt f o r for e ign polic y guida n ce which w a s not 
forth c om i n g . Fra nklin Roo se v e lt eve ntu a lly s olve d the . d i l e mma by 
acting a s hi s own S e cr e t a ri es of Sta t e , War an d Navy, d e a l ing dir e ctly 
20. D a vis, Th e Admir a l's Lobb y , p. 144. 
21. W a lte r Millis , with H a r ve y C. M a n s fi e ld a nd Harold Ste in, 
Arm s a nd t h e Stat e (N e w York : T w e n t ie th C e ntury Fund, 
1958 ) , p . 20. 
22. Loui s M orton , "Interse rvic e C o -ope r a t i on a n d Politica l-
Milita r y Colla bora t i o n , ' ' Tota l W a r a nd Cold W a r, H a rry L . 
C oles , e d . ( Col umbu s : Ohi o Sta t e Univ ~r sity Pr es s, 19 62 ) , 
p. 142 . 
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with the n1ilitar y h ead s of the se r vi c e s in pro se c uting World W a r II. 
Towa rd the e nd of the wa r, S ec r e t a ry of the N av y J a m es Forres t a l 
appra i se d the un t e n a ble s itua t i on of th e milita ry in p e ac e time , as the 
country r e fu s e d to fa c e the r e aliti e s of inte rna tiona l p o litic s . Much 
the s a m e t e mp e r was app a r e nt in the )930's. H e s e nt fri e nds copies 
of Kiplin g' s "Tom1ny Atkin s " on th e soldie r' s lot in p e ac e : 23 
For it' s Tomm y thi s , a nd Tominy tha t , a n ' 11 chuck 
him out, th e brute !" 
But it's "Saviour of 'is country" whe n the guns 
b e gin to shoot. 
23. Walte r Milli s , e d., The Forr e sta l Dia ri e s (Ne w York: The 
Viking Pr e s s , 1951), p. 100. 
CHAPTER IV 
UNIFICATION AND STRATEGY 
The Unite d Sta tes Navy has had to deal with a series of critical 
problems since World War II, most of which grew out of the move 
toward unification of the s.e rvic e s. The unification controversy 
was basically one of inte r se rvic e r e l ations and defe ns e organization, 
but it included broad que stions conce rning the role s and missions 
of th e services, s e l e ction of strate gic weapons systems and the 
allocation of funds . 
In th e organization i ssue, the Army Air Force wanted inde pende nce 
of and equality with the othe r t w o services ; the Army backe d the Air 
For ce and wanted c e ntrali ze d control of all thr ee s e rvi ces; the Navy 
and the Marine Corp s f e ar e d s ubordina tion or e limination. The 
unification problem was partially s olve d b y the National Se curity 
Act of 194 7 and its 1949 ame ndme nts, and the a llocation of roles and 
mis s ion s at the K e y W es t and N ewport Confe r e nces in 1948 reas s ur e d 
the sea services of the ir futur e importa nce. As far as st r a t e gic 
role s were conc e rne d, each servic e f e lt it had to ju s tify its exi s tence 
in t e rm s of a g e n e r a l wa r with the Sovie t Union. The Air Forc e opte d 
whole -hearte dly for s tra t e gic air power, w hile th e .Anny and the Navy 
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called for "balanced forc e s. ,,l 
Th e i nters e rvic e rivalry tha t gr e w from the unification qu e stion 
c aused e ach servic e to publicly d e fine and articul ate its goals . The 
Ai r Forc e first a s k e d for 70 bornber groups, which was a pp roved by 
Congre ss but r e fus e d by the Exe cutive. The Army based its plans 
on univer s a l military training, l ong a d e vi sive issue in the country . 
The Navy, r e j e cting M a han, conce ntrate d on naval air power and the 
requisite l arge carriers, plus enough dive rsification in the fle e t t o 
meet any conceivabl e l e ve l of thr e at . 
For the pu r p os e s of this paper, the unification and strategy 
issues will b e tr e ate d in a roughly chronologic a l s e que nc e emphasizi ng 
the Navy's r e lation s with Congr e s s . The discussion will b egin with 
the first formal h ea rings on unification in 1944, and wi ll .be carrie d 
thro ugh to S e c r e tary Robe rtS . McNama ra's arrival at the Pentagon . 
Mr. McNamara's t e rm 1n office is in itself a wat e rshe d in Am e rican 
military policy . 
· Pre s sure for unific a tion, a nd th e Navy- Air Force battle over 
avi a ti on policy w e r e not r e sult s of World War II ; the s ee ds had been 
sowed in th e p e riod between the wars , and much of the r e sulting dis -
tru st was reap e d in th e late 19 40 ' s . The Army Air S e rvi c e h ad b e gun 
it s campa ign for inde p e nde nc e as far back as 191 9 . The "ground" 
Army oppos e d fr a grne nta tion of its s e rvice, and g en e rally supporte d 
.. 1. Sa mu e l P . Huntington, The Common De f e ns e ( N e w York: 
C ol umbia Unive rsity Pre ss , 1962 ), pp. 372- 374 . 
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th e Navy's oppo sition to unif.ication during th e n ext two d e cade s. 
During World War II the Army unde r G e n e ral G e orge C. Marshall 
b egan to change its mind, and s upporte d the Air Forc e concept of 
three s e rvices Lmified at th e top . 2 Both the Army and the Navy 
b egan to plan for their versions of post-war or ganization in 1943, 
with little or no contact betwe e n the two s e rvic e s . An unofficial 
staff study originated in the War D e partme nt G eneral Staff in early 
· 1943, entitled 11A Single D e partme nt of War in the Po s t- wa r P e riod, 11 
and was endors e d by G eneral Marsha ll. This pape r l ed to the Woodrum 
Committee h e arings in 1944, th e first fornial confrontation b e tween 
th e service s ove r unification . 3 
One particular e v e nt m 1943 for esh a dowed the p e nding service 
clash, and illu strates one of th e fundamental diffe_r e nce s b e tween 
th e Navy and Air Force approaches to organizational is sues. In 
May, AdmiralErnes t J. King, Chi ef of Naval Operations and 
Commander in Chi e f, United States Flee t, establi shed the Tenth 
Flee t to ca rry out anti - submarine warfa r e ope rations in the Atlantic . 
. As certain Army Air Force squadrons e ngage d in anti- submarine 
warfare wer e op e rating in a somewhat confus e d state with the T enth 
Fleet, Admiral King propos e d tha t these Army units be put under 
op e rationa l control of appropria t e S e a Fronti e r commanders or 
2. Vincent Davis, Po s t wa r Defe n se Policy and th e U. S o Navy, 
1943-19 46 ( Chape l Hill: Th e Unive r sity of North Carolina 
Pres s, 1966), pp. 48 - 51. 
3. Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
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special task forc e s to coordinate op e rations. The Army r e plied with 
a suggestion that th e Army Air Force t ake ove r all l a nd-bas e d air 
under a C oastal Air Command, to b e ernploye d as an autonomous 
forc e . 
The -issue was finally settle d by the Army agre e ing to withdraw 
comple t eiy from anti-subn1.ar ine warfar e , afte r tr ans f e rring certain of 
its speci a lly- equipp e d B- 24 aircraft to the Navy . The N av y in turn 
would p e rmit the Army to draw Navy r eplacement B-24' s . G eneral 
M a r s h a ll wante d Admiral King to promi se that th e N avy would not use 
its B-24's to infring e on the Army Air Forc e 's long-range bombing 
mi ss ion. 
' 
Thi s in s t ance c l ea rly illu s trate d w hat was to b e a major obstacle 
to unification . The Navy f e lt function should b e the b as is for organiza ,.. 
tion, and the Army was convinc e d the weapon should dete rmine organ1-
zation. In the N avy conce pt, se rvic e s should b e assigned b as ic 
function s and given the b ases and w e apons to fulfill the se function s . 
regardless of whe the r the weapons operate d on l and , sea, or in the air. 
The Army approach was tha t the Air Force should control and op e rate 
all aircraft, that th e N avy should control and op erat e all ships, and 
' that the Army s hould b e r esponsible for a ll ground action . 4 
A numbe r of f actors made it q uite e vide nt even during .the war 
4. Ernes t J . King, Flee t Admiral, U.S. N avy , and Walte r Muir 
Whit e hill, Flee t Admiral King : A N avy R ec ord (New York : 




that th e Navy and the Air Fo rce would clash on unification . Both were 
concerned about post- war roles in national d e f e ns e policy: naval 
officers saw the increasing popularity and political powe r of the Air 
Force as threat e ning the Navy's role in nationa l d e fense policy; Air 
Forc e supporters saw strategic a ir power as the wave of the futur e , 
if not the present, and we r e d e t e nnined tha t the Air For ce should 
r eceive prope r r ecognition and influe nce in the n a tion' s military 
structur e . To attain thi s the Air Forc e espou se d d e f e nse unification, 
autonomy for the Air Force , a s ing l e military Chie f of Staff, and a 
7 0-group s trategic bombe r forc e . 
To the Navy, unifi cation and a sin g l e Chief of Staff would mean, 
under th e circumstances of the t ime , tha t the Chi e f would almost 
certainly b e an air g e n e r a l committed to the air powe r the ory of 
warfar e . The ground a rmy , w hich no longe r had any aviation of it s 
own, was wi lling to accept thi s . The N av y, with it s l arge inves tme nt 
i n air powe r, f ea r e d appropria ti on of its airplanes by th e Air Force 
and it s M arine Corps di vi s ion s by the Army. 5 
World War II color e d the battle to a gr eat extent, as the services 
experience d fr e que nt problems in op e r ating jointly on a s tra t egic scale . 
·It was r eali ze d b y a ll s e rvic es tha t some sort of r e organi z ation was 
necessary to give formal, l egal s t a tu s to th e i1n provi sations e ffe cte d 
by the Joint Chi e fs of Staff during the wa r . 
5. W a lt e r Millis, Arms a nd M en ( N ew Y ork : Capric o rn Books, 
1956 ) , pp . 311 - 312 . 
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Toward th e end of the war, th e Navy b ecame concerned by the 
Army' s a ttitude tow a rd unity of comma~d. As soon as the Navy ' s 
coope ration in Europe was no l onge r n ece ssary, the Arm.y rejected 
the principle of unity of command if it could not appoint and control 
the comrnande r. In addition, th e Navy b egan to suspect that one of 
the chief goals of the Army's unifi cation plans was the weakening 
of the Navy ' s position in the appropriations process , and that the 
goal of some of th e War D epartme nt ' s mor e extrerne e l ements was 
virtual destruction of th e Navy. 6 
B e for e World War II, s e rvic e political controversy involved 
each service s truggling inde p en d ently against civilian isolationists, 
pacifists and ec onomizers . Th e l egi s lation concerning the two 
services was handle d by separate Hous e and Senat e Committees , 
and separate a ppropriation s subconnnittees . Afte r the War the 
futur es of the services were interde p endent . The pro spec t of a 
unifi e d d e f e nse organization meant competition ove r orga nizational 
position and strategic doctrine and unifi e d appropriations bills 
meant a d ecide d increase in compe tition for fund s . 7 
I n the long run, some good came from the compe tition. 
Professor Huntington w rit e s: "inte r se rvic e riva lry, by challenging 
the services, also toughe n e d them an d forced the m to d eve lop the 
6. D emet rios Cara l e y, The Politics of Military U ni fication (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1966),_ pp. 92-93 . 
7 . Huntington, The Common D e f e nse, pp. 370-371. 
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m ech anisms· a nd s upport n ecessa ry for s urvi val in the plu r a li s ti c 
w o rld of A merican p oliti cs . . . . In t e r se r v i ce c om p e t i t i on thu s t ende d 
to prornote the c on t in u e d exis t ence of the se r vi ces themse l ve s. 118 
The zeal of the Army avi ato rs an d the ir self-identification 
as a n ew br ee d of m ilita ry t e chn ologi st s , a s w e ll as their u se of 
publi cit y stun t s , provoke d a st r ong r eaction in th e N a vy' s offi ce r 
corp s . R ea r Admir a l Willia m A . Moffe tt, the fir s t Chi e f of the 
Bureau of A e r onauti cs , w r ot e t o a fri end conce rning G ene r a l Mitch e ll' s 
atta ck s on the N a vy' s a pproa ch to a v i a tion: 11A s you know , to th e 
av e rage Naval offi ce r the wo rd "publi cit y " i s ana the m a . I w as 
brought up to h a t e it myse lf, a nd s till h a t e it. 11 9 This tr a ditiona l 
di s like fo r publ~c ity was couple d wi th the n aval avi a tor s 1 s tron g e r 
affection for thei r se r vi ce tha n for the ir avi a ti on un it s . The cru sading 
Anny avi a t o r s h a d, in the N a vy's vi ew , b e h a v e d in a m anne r mo s t 
un s uita ble t o office r s an d the ir sea r c h for politi cal f a vor and publi cit y 
w as s h amel ess . A s a r es ult, th e N a vy w a s for ce d to p a rti a lly a b and on 
it s traditional di s t as t e fo r politi cs and j o in the b a ttle . 
As the issues i n the unifi cati on controve r s y cla rifi e d, the N avy 
n eve r d eni e d the r ight of t he Ai r For ce to i n d e p endence ; the N avy wa s 
prima r i l y op p ose d t o cent rali ze d powe r a t t he t op of a unifi e d d efense 
8 . Samuel P. H unt ington, 11lnte r se r vi ce Com p e t i t i on a nd the 
Politi cal Rol es of t he Arme d S e r vi ces , 11 Tota l W a r and 
Cold W a r, H ar r y L. C o l es, e d. ( Colum b us : Ohio Sta t e 
U ni v e r si t y Pr e s s , 19 6 2 ) , p . 2 0 5 . 
9·. Davis, P os t wa r D e f e n se Poli cy and the U . S , N avy , 19 43 -1 946, 
pp. 44-47. 
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organi zation, and most particularly to a single Chi e f of Sta ff of the 
Arme d Forces . Throughout the unific a tion procee dings, the Navy 
stre ss e d the extent to which centralized executive authority would 
dimini sh congressional influence. 10 The Navy insiste d on indi~idual 
service autonomy and d e taile d spe cification of the services 1 comba tant 
function s , to protect n ava l aviation and the Marine Corps from 
domi nation by the othe r services. 
N aval officers wanted to maintain a strong Navy with the World 
War II functions of nava l a viation and Marines unimpai r e d. Too much 
·centralize d control would, they f e"a r e d, result in a lo ss of combat 
, _ effective n ess . Finally, the Navy was not favorably dispos e d to any 
cha nge which migbt di s tort the favorabl e r e lations the y had enjoyed 
with the Pr es ide nt and particularly with Congress by introducing a 
new l evel of control. ll 
In · March, 19 44, Congr e ss b e came involve d in the unification 
ques tion for th e first time . R e presentative J ames W. Wadsworth 
introduc e d a r es olution calling for the creation of a 11Se lect C01nmittee 
on Post-war Military Policy" to consist of seven members each from 
the Hou se Military and Naval Affa irs Committees , and nin e Congress-
m e n who were m e mbe rs of n e ither. The r es olution directed "the 
Committee , acting as whol e or by s ub comrnittee , to investigate a ll 
10. Samue l P. H untington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge : 
Belkna p Press of H a r va rd Unive r s ity, 1?57 ) , p. 422. 
11. Cara l ey , The Politi c s of Military Unifica tion, p. 10 8. 
, . 
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matters r e lating to the p os t-wa r military requir e m ent s of th e Unite d 
Sta tes . " 12 R e prese nta tiv e Clifton A. Woodrum of Virginia was 
name d as chairman . 
The fi.rst m .atter to b e discuss e d when the h earings op e n e d on 
April 24 was the organiza tion of th e military s e rvices into a single 
d e partment, to include a separate air forc e . Although the chairrnan 
explaine d that th e comrnittee was simply a comm.ittee of inquiry and 
not of l egislation, th e War D e p a rtment r e pres e ntatives r e que ste d . 
g e n e ral congres s ional approval of it s unification plan "in principle, 11 
po stponing d e tailed l egislation until aft e r the war . The War Depart-
ment ' s plan was to creat e a single executive d e partme nt, with a single 
military chi e f of staff under the civilian secretary of th e d epa rtment, 
but over a ll of the se r vices . The Army claimed that unifi e d arme d 
forc es would e lirninate "waste and duplication, 11 would guarantee more 
comprehensive and mor e adequate pla nning, and would r e sult in b e tter 
tean1.work in war. This would assure mor e co-ordination b e t ween 
military a n d for e ign policy, and would provide one compre h e n s ive 
military budge t for Congress to conside r. 13 
12. U.S. Congress , Hous e of Representatives, S e l ect C01nmittee 
on Po s t-war M i lita ry Policy, Proposal to Esta bli s h a Single 
D e partn1.ent of Armed Forces , h ea rings b e for e the S e l ect 
Committee on Post- wa r Milita ry Poli c y, 7 8th Cong . , 2nd 
sess. (Was hing ton: G . P. 0 . , 1944) H e r e ina ft e r referred to 
- as Woodrum Com1n itt ee H ea rings , p. l. 
13 . Ibid., pp. 5-119 . 
~- . . -
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The Navy ' s cas e was l~ad by Sec r eta ry of the Nav y J anl.es 
Forre sta l, who h a d announ c e d tha t h e w a s rinot pr e p a r e d to say tha t 
the Navy b e l i e v e s t hat the cons olidation into on e d e p a rtme nt is 
14 d e sir abl e . " The forc e of th e N a v y 's argum.ent w as that no d e ci sian 
of any kind on unification woul d b e t a k e n until the war was over, it s 
. . 15 
l e sson s diges ted, and th e combat the ate r cornmande rs h e ard frorn. . 
Navy Sec r e t a ry Frank Knox di e d on Apri l 28, the same day the first 
Navy D e p a rtm e nt witnesses we r e h e ard . Knox had supporte d th e War 
D e partme nt ' s proposal a nd his support, according to P a ul Hammon d, 
indu c e d S e cr etary of Wa r Henry L. Stin1:son, against his b e tt e r 
judgme nt, to ope n his d e p a rtme nt ' s unific ation ca1n p a ign b e for e the 
Woodrum C om1nittee . l6 Th e lo ss of Knox defi nite ly hinde r e d 
acc e pta n ce of the War D e p a rtme nt proposals. 
Congres sman Ca r l Vinson, Cha irman of the Hou se Naval Affa irs 
Committee , a ide d the Na vy ' s c as e conside rabl y by careful probing 
into the l ogic of the W a r D e p a rtm e nt's proposal. H e aske d how the y 
could propos e combi~ing t w o se r v ices into one unifi e d d epartlne nt 
.on the one h and, whi l e a t the same tim e wanting to cre ate thr e e 
14. Walte r Milli s , with Ha rvey C. M an s fi e ld and Harold Ste in, 
Arm s a nd the Sta t e ( N e w York : Tw e nti e th C e ntury Fund, 
19 58 }, p. 146. 
15. Wood r um C om mittee H e arings , p . 134. 
16. Paul Y. H a m m ond, Or gani z ing for D e f e n se (Prince ton : Princ e ton 
U n i v e rsity P re s s , 196 1), pp . 190- 19 1. 
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s e rvi ces in the place· of t wo w hi ch wo uld d e feat any in.crease d e ffici e ncy 
ga ine d b y unif i c a tion . 17 The comm ittee soon r eali ze d tha t a d eep split 
exist e d b e t wee n the t w o s e r vi ces , and a gr ee d to po s tpo ne the h ea ring s 
inde fi n ite ly . No r ec omme nda tion was forthcoming frorn the Woodrum 
C ommittee on u n ific a t i on. 
Th e n ext phase in th e unifi cation con trove r s y was th e study and 
r e port m a d e by th e J oint Chi e f s of Staff Sp e c i a l Committe e on 
R e orga ni zation, a g roup s e t up b y the J oint Chi e f s in M ay h ead e d 
b y Admira l J. 0 . R ich a rd s on. The c ommittee w a s supp ose d to 
include t w o N av y and t w o Army offi ce rs, but the Wa r D e partme nt 
succee d e d in a dding a fifth " a lte r n ate " m e mbe r, w ho t ook a n acti ve 
p a rt in th e s tudy . The R ichard s on Committee int e r v i e w e d 56 top 
mili t a ry commande r s in th e fi e l d to d e t e r m ine t h e ir vi ews on post -
war mil ita ry r e organi z ation . 
T h e committee found the gr eat m a jority of Army offic e r s and 
a b out h a lf th e N av y offi c er s in fav or of som e sort of singl e d e p a rtrn ent 
f or t h e Arrne d For ces . 18 The c ommittee s ubmitt e d it s r e port t o the 
J oint Chi e f s of Staff on April 11 , 1945, with a ll the m e mbe rs but 
Adxnira l Richa rd s on in a gree m e nt. The committee r e comme nde d a 
singl e D e p a rtment o f the Arme d For ces , w i th a c ivili a n h ead of the 
d e p a rtment, a milita r y h ead w ho w ould b e Chi e f of Sta ff to the Presid e nt 
17 . Woodr um C ommittee H ea rings , pp . 5 4 -63 . 
18 . H ammond , Or ganizing f o r Defe n se , p. 19 7. 
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and Comman d e r of the Anne d Forces unde r the S e creta ry, a Unite d 
Sta t e s Chief s of Staff organiza tion to advis e th e Preside nt on military 
matte r s , an inde p e nde nt Air Forc e and an Unde r Se cre tary to run th e 
busine s s side of the d e p a rtme nt. 19 
Secreta ry Forre sta l was p e ssimistic as early as S e pte mbe r, 1944, 
while the committee was still conducting interviews. He wrote to a 
friend: "I have b ee n t e lli ng King, Nimit.z and Company it ' s my judg-
:r:ne nt that as of today the Navy has lost it s cas e , and that e ithe r in 
Congre ss or 111 a public poll the Army's point of view would prevail. rr 20 
Paul Hammond b e li e v e s the N a vy commande.rs in the Pacific, far 
remove d from the Wa s hington b a ttl e gro1,1nd, did not unde rstand th e 
import of the unific a tion struggle , and confus e d 11 unific a tion of the 
arme d forc es rr with 11 unity of command. 11 The s e senior naval offic e rs 
define d unity of co1nmand a s a structur e that would e nabl e the Joint 
C hi e fs to e x e cute military policy without 11political 11. inte rfere nce, 
subje ct to control only fr01n the Pr e side nt. 2 1 
In May, S e nator David I. Walsh, Chairman of the S e nate Naval 
Affairs Committee , sugge ste d to Forre s t al that a modifi e d unifica tion 
pla n might b e in orde r. Forr e stal told Walsh 11the Navy Departme nt 
19 . Ibid., pp . 199-200. 
20 . W a lte r Milli s , e d . , The Forre stal Diaries ( N e w York: The 
Viking Press , 1951 ) , p . 60. 
2 1. H a mmond, O rganizing for D e f e n s e, pp. 201-203 . 
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cannot b e in the pos i tion of m e r e ly t aki n g the n e g a ti ve in this dis-
cus s ion, but must come up with po s iti ve and constru ctiv e r e conJ.m e nda -
tions . ,,2 2 Accordingly, Forre stal aske d an old fri end, F e rdina nd 
Ebe rstadt, to make a thorough s tudy of curr e nt unification prop.os a l s . 
Eberstadt w as aske d to d e t e rmine if unific a tion of the s e r vice s unde r 
a single · h e ad would improve n a tional s e curity; if not, wha t change s . 
in the military organi z ation hav e b ee n indica t e d as n e ce ssary by 
the country' s war exp e ri e nce; what gov e rnme ntal organi zation sho.uld 
be pr e scribe d to e nable the n1ilitary a nd othe r gove rnme nt d e part -
m e nt s a nd a g e ncies to mo s t effe ct i v e ly provide for n a tional s e curity. 23 
In June , 1945, S ec r e tary Forr e sta l s e nt the N a vy ' s propo se d 
per s onne l s tr e ngth plan to th e Pr e side nt; and a nnounce d the servi ce ' s 
overall po s tw a r plans to a joint s e ssion of the S e nate and Hous e N a val 
Affai rs Committee s . The committees ' ch<;~.irme n, S e nator Walsh and 
C ongre ssma n Vin s on, c a lle d th e spe c i a l s ession to provide the Navy 
with a cong r es sional f o rum. Forres tal aga in l e d N a vy e fforts to 
avoid b e ing ov e rsha dowe d by the Air Forc e and the Army. Forr e stal's 
remarks to the joint s e ssion outline d the country ' s n ee·d for sea powe r, 
how e v e r powe rful th e land and air s e rvices might b e. H e c a lle d for 
rete ntion of balance d forc e s in the N a vy, and s tr esse d tha t the N a vy 
22 . Millis, e d., The Forres t a l Di a ri es , p. 61. 
23 . Ibid., p. 63. 
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did not seek world-wide naval sup e riority, but only on the sea 
approaches to the Unite d Sta t es and its po ssessions. 2 4 · 
Congressman Vinson said the Navy's plans were too conservative, 
and subsequently scheduled h earings in his House committee, to open 
in S e pte mber. In the inte rim, Forres tal talke d to President Trurnan 
about po s t-war military organization . The President was in favor 
of a single De partme nt of D e fense , according to Forrestal, who told 
Truman he had "great r ese rvation s about th e practical possibility of 
any _ one man running a show as big, even in peace time, as the combined 
25 Army, Navy and Air Force. 11 
In Septemb e r, Vinson opened h ea rings on Hous e Concurrent 
Resolution 80, entitled 11 C01nposition of the Postwa.r Navy, 11 to 
advanc e the Na vy 's case without submitting d e tail e d l egislation. The 
chi e f witness e s were Sec r eta ry Forres tal, Admiral King, and 
Vic e Adrn.iral Freder ick J . Horne , Vic e Chi e f ofNaval Op e ration s . 
They em.phasized the continuing need for a strong Navy, regardless 
of the types of weapons d eve loped. Witness es pointed out that attacks 
on the Unit e d States r equi red crossing the sea; and that the country ' s 
major enemies in the last two wars fail e d to control the seas and 
wer e d e feat ed . Finally and p e rhaps most important, they inferr e d 
that th e Navy regarded carrier- base d air as th e striking arm of the 
24. Davis, Postwa r D e fense Policy and the U . S , Navy, 1943- 1946, 
pp. 157-160. 
25. Millis, e d ., The Forres tal Di a ri es , pp. 88 - 89 . 
fl ee t. 2 6 In thi s context, Forrestal sa id that the atom i c bon:"lb was 
"still a bomb , r e quiring l and - or carrier-based planes to deliver 
., 7 . 
it. ,, .... Mor e expli ci tly, th e Secreta ry said, 11 th e control of th e sea 
and of the ai r above it is the mission of the Unite d Sta t es Navy·_-
and th e Navy will continue to di scharge that mission w ith whatever 
w eapons are the most e ffective . rr28 
Vinson took his r esolution frorn committee to the Hous e , 
emphasizing th e rol e of air power and aircraft carriers in th e postwar 
Navy . 29 The resolution p asse d the Hous e by a unanimou s vote, 
. recomme nding a b a l anced fl ee t, c.entered around t en active h eavy 
carriers and th e r equire d support ships. 30 The Senat e took no 
furth e r action on th e Hou se r esolution. 
In mid- October 1945 th e S enate Military Aifair s Committee 
op e n e d h earings on unification . Until now , the Navy h ad appeared 
to b e reca lcitrant, opposing an efficien t a nd economica l modernization 
26. U . S . Congress , Hou se of R ep re sent ati ves , Committee on 
Nava l Affa ir s , Composition of the Postwa r N avy, h earings 
before the Hou se Committee on Naval Affairs on Hou se 
Concurre nt R esoluti on 80, bound as Ite m No. 1 10 in a 
singl e volume enti tle d Sund ry L egis l ation Affecting the 
Naval Establishment 194-5, 79th Cong. , 1st se s s. 
(Washing ton, G. P . 0., 1945 ) , pp . 11 64 -: 1165. 
27. Ibid., p . 1165. 
28. Ibid. 
29 . Congr e ssional Record, 79th Cong . , 1st sess . pp . 1053 , 1056 . 




of the milita ry for r.e a s on s of p e tty ambition or pre stige . 31 The n on 
O c tobe r 22, Forr e s tal introduce d the Ebe rstadt R e port on unification. 
Ebe r sta dt propo se d thr ee coordina t e s e rvic e s, e ach heade d by 
a s e cr e tary with a S e cre t a ry of D e f e n se to supe rvi se all thr e e. H e 
recornm e nde d the Joint Chi e fs of Sta ff b e made a statutory body, 
str e s s ing unifi e d op e r a tiona l command of th e arme d forc e s. For the 
large r pi·oble m of strate gic pla nni n g a nd r e sourc e alloc ati on, 
Ebe r s t a dt r e comme nde d a Nationa l S e curity Coun cil, a C e ntral 
Inte llige n ce Age ncy, a N a tional S e curity R e sources Boa rd, a C e ntral 
R esearch and D e ve lopm e nt Age ncy and a Military Education and 
Training Board. 32 The National S e curity Council would link th e State 
D epartrne nt to th e thr ee military s e rvic e s and coordina t e a ll four . 
The othe r a g e ncies would corre lat e military pla nning with e conomic, 
inte lli g e nc e and production plannin g . 
. Within e ight d a ys, the Arm y submitte d it s pla n, r e fe rred to 
as the "Collin s Pla n" afte r the primary drafte r, Lie ute nant G e n e r a l 
J. Law ton Collins. The Collin s Pla n calle d for a s ingle D epartme nt 
of D e f e ns e , a single S e cr e t a r y , and a single Chie f of Sta ff of th e 
Arme d Force s who would b e not only adv isor but " e xecutiv e " for th e 
S e cretary . The Air Forc e was to b e s e p a rate a nd co- e qual, and w ould 
31. Milli s , e d. , The Forr e s t a l Di ari e s, pp. 152- 153. 
32. H a mmond, Or ganiz ing for D efe n se , pp. 152-153. 
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control a ll land- b ase d comb at avi a tion. 33 The two plans and th e 
ensuing d e bate r e ite rate d the fundam e ntal diffe r e nc e b e t wee n the 
organizational philosophie s of th e t wo services . Th e N avy intende d 
to 1naintain the service d e p artments a s the pre dominant e l e ments 
1n the military es t a bli shment , with op e rational control passing 
from the President through th e Joint Chie fs. The Army ' s g ene ral 
staff concept would put maximum pow e r in the h a nds of the "Secretary 
of National D e f en s e 11 and hi s Chief of Staff of the Arm e d Forces. 
In th e midst of th e s e organi zational.de b a te s, G en e ral of th e 
Army H. H. Arnold, Conl.manding G e n e ral, Army Air Forces , made 
his last r e port to the Pres ide nt in Nove mbe r, 1945 :34 
In any- futur e war the Air Force , b eing unique 
amon g the arme d servic e s in its ability to r each 
any po ssibl e ene1ny with out l ong d e l ay , will 
undoubte dly b e th e first to engage the e n e my 
and, if this is done ea rly enough, it may 
remov e the n ecess ity for e xtended surface 
conflict. It is e ntir e ly pos s ible that the 
progress ive d eve lopment of th e air arnl. .. 
will r e duc e th e r e quirement for or e mployment . 
of m ass armies and navies. . . . The Strategic 
theory, as applie d to the Unite d States Air 
Warfare conc ept, po s tulates tha t air attack 
on inte rnal enemy vitals can so d epl e t e 
specifi c indu str i a l and e conomic r esou rces , and 
on occasion th e will to r e sist, as to nl.ake 
continue d r es i s t a nce by th e e n e my impo ssibl e . . . . 
33. Milli s , Arms a nd the State , p . 154. 
34. Walte r Milli s , e d . , Ame ric a n Milita ry Thou ght (New Yo rk : 
The Bobbs-Me rri ll Company, In c . , for th~ Ame rican 
H e ritage S e ries , 1966 ) , pp. 445-458. 
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Arnold a dde"d tha t a n e ffi c i e nt Air Forc e in b e ing at all times will 
not alon e b e s uffici e nt, but with o ut it the r e could b e no n a tiona l 
s e curity. H e did say tha t "it i s the t eam of the Army, N a vy and 
Air Forces working in clo se coop e r a ti on tha t g ive s str e ngth to our 
anne d services in peac e or war, " 35 but conclucle dby calling for 
"ruthle ss e limina tion of all arms, bra nches, s e rvic e s, w e apons, 
equipme nt or ideas who se rete ntion might b e indicate d only by 
tradition, sentime nt or s h e e r ine rtia . .. 36 
G e n e ral Arnold 1 s state m e nt confirmed three long- standing 
Navy su spicions: th e Air Force claime d pre dominance in the 1~ation 1 s 
military strategi c pla nning; the Air Force fully inte nde d to absorb 
as much of the Navy 1 s air capability a s possible; and the Air Forc e 
did not anticipate any strategic rol e at all for e ithe r the Navy or the 
Army. Finally, Arnold 1 s ren1.a rks about 11 ruthle ss e limination 11 of 
branche s whos e· r e t e ntion might b e indicated by tradition or .sentime nt 
infuriate d the M a rine Corps. 
On D e c e mb e r 19, 1945, Pre side nt Truman s e nt a unification 
message to Congr es s, a c c e pting the Ebe rstadt recomme nda tions on 
highe r orga ni z ation to m es h military planning and for e ign policy, 
and co-ordina tion of the military, economic and political a sp e ct s 
35 . Ibid., p. 449. 
36. Ibid. , p. 458 . 
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of n a tiona l s ec uri t y . The Pr es i dent s upporte d the Colli n s Pla n f o r 
the organi zation of the D e f ense De p artment a nd t h e s ingle Ch ie f of 
Staff. S e nator Elbe rt D. Thomas , ch a irman of the Milita ry Affa ir s 
Comm ittee , b egan w ork ing on a n a d m i n i s tr a tion - s pon s ore d unifi cation 
bill. Thomas ' committee r e porte d the bill out in mid-April 1946. 
Th e Thomas B i ll m ainta in e d the Chie f of Staff a s principa l 
advi s o r to the Sec r e t a r y of N a tiona l Def~n se , while the J oi n t Chie f s 
qf Sta ff w ould ma inta in th e ir po s iti on as princip a l milita r y advi s or s 
to the Pre sident. The Nav y oppo se d the Thomas propo sal s veh em.e ntly, 
and both se r v i ces we r e vocife rou s i n the ir public lobby ing b e for e the 
bill was r e porte d. On April ll, the Pr~sident rapp e d the Navy for 
- -
. h t t. ll d . . t . . l 3 7 oppo s 1ng w a was es s en 1a y a n a .m 1n1s r a t1 on proposa . 
In M a y, the Presi d e nt calle d t ogethe r the S ec r e t ari es of W a r 
and th e N av y and t o ld th e m t o se ttl e the ir diffe r enee s. Admi ral 
William D. L eahy , the P res ide nt' s top m ilita ry adv i sor, expla ine d 
his r eas ons f o r opp os i ng a s i ngl e ch ie f of sta ff. S~c r e ta ry of W a r 
Robert P . P a t te r son a dmi tt e d h e was not pr e p a r e d to "jump into th e 
ditch an d die" for the idea . The Pres ide nt said h e was prirnaril y 
inte r es t e d in unification , a nd a sing l e Ch ie f of Sta ff was "too mu ch 
along the lines o f th e .'man on hor se b ack ' philosoph y ." Truman 
impli e d tha t the M a r i n e Co r p s a nd naval a via ti on n ee d not b e conce r ne d 
37. Milli s , The F orrestal D iaries, p . 151. 
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about absorption by the A r my and th e Air Forc e . 3 8 Finally, the 
Pres ide nt said h e inte nde d to h ave ' 'ceilings " for d e f ense costs, which 
would cau se considerable problems in 1948 with the Communist coup 
in C zecho s lovakia a nd the B e rlin blockade . 
Two proble m s r ernaine d to b e solved b e t ween the services : 
the role of the new Sec retary of D e f e ns e , and the role s and missions 
of the arme d forc es . The Navy d es ired to restrict the Se cretary to 
the role of "coordinator," and the Army wanted s trong control at th e 
top. The Pres ident announced in June that h e supported a single 
Department of National D efe n se unde r a Secre t a ry of Cabinet r a nk, 
with the three service secretaries subordinate. The Navy would 
maintain the Marine Corps as a combat forc e·, but land-bas e d 
reconnaissance and anti- subm.arine aircraft would go to the Air 
Force . 
Little was done in the r emainde r of 1946 on unific a tion . In fact, 
the Navy-Air For ce disagr eein ents were ac e rbate d when the Pres ide nt 
appro ve d Air Forc e participa tion in the Navy's atomic t es t series at 
Bikini. The Navy wa s una bl e to conduct a numb e r of the tests it had 
planne d, and the scientific us e fuln ess of the first test was virtually 
destroye d when the Air Force i ns iste d it n ee d e d practic e in dropping 
bombs from a ircra ft instead of d e tonating the weapon fr·orn an anchored 
balloon . The bom.b missed the t a rge t by t w o mile s, damaging many of 
38. Millis, Arms and the State, p. 171. 
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the data-gathe ring instrumen ts. The Air Forc e announced publicly 
that the ext e n s i ve damage to t es t ships prove d s hip s wer e intol e rantly 
vulne r able in the atomic age ; the Navy hotly d e ni e d this and said the 
ships wer e obsole t e ' anchor e d, unmanne d and clo se ly group e d in 
confined waters, which would not b e the cas e in fl ee t operations . 3 9 
In another p e rtine nt d eve lop1nent , th e Hous e and the Se nate in 
1946 combine d the ir Military and Naval .Affa ir s Committees , to pro-
vide for a singl e Committee on th e Armed S e rvices in each chambe r, 
anticipa ting e v entual unification of the services unde r one cabinet p ost . 
On J anuary 16 , 194 7, the White Hou se releas e d a statement 
signe d by the Sec r e taries of War and the Navy, announcing agre ement 
b etween th e s e r vices on the propos e d military orga nization. T h e 
r ecomme nda tions called for a s ingle Sec reta ry of D e f e ns e wi th 
coordinating powe rs, a Nationa l Security Council, a War Council, a 
Nati onal Security R es ources Board, a C entra l Inte llige nc e Age ncy, 
and a comma nd structure h ead e d by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 40 The 
proble1n of the roles and mi ss ions for the servic e s was to b e d ecid e d 
.by executive orde r rathe r than l aw , and the two Se cr e t aries drafte d 
a proposal giving the Marine Co~ps primary r esponsibility for 
amphibiou s wa rfa r e and the N avy primary r esponsibility for it s own 
39 . D a vis, Postwa r Defense Policy and the U.S . Navy , 1943- 1946, 
pp. 244-246 . 
40. U.S . Cong r ess , S e n a t e , C01n1nittee on Arme d Servic es , Nation -
a l D e fense E s t a blishment (Unification of the Arme d S e rvices ), 
H ea ring s b efore the Committee on Armed S e rvi ces on Senat e 
R es olution 75 8, U.S . S enat e , 80th Cong., 1st s css . (Washington : 
G. P. 0 . , 1947 ), . pp. 2-3. 
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l a nd-base d r econnais sanc e and p a trol ai rcraft. 
H ea rings on the a dmini s tr a tion' s unificati on prop osal b egan in . 
March, 1947 , and th e Cong ress slowly wo rked out what wo uld b e the 
Nationa l Security Act of 1947 . Th e h ea rings were highlighte d by 
Congress ional references to the "browbeating" of military witnesses 
by th e ir civilian superiors, 4l and some highly-charge d t est imon y by 
the Comma ndant of th e M a rine Corps and the pres ide nt of th e Marine 
Corps R ese rve A ssoci a tion highlighte d the hearings. The M a rines 
w e r e still concerned about th eir futur e in t.h e "unifie d armed for ces ," 
and wanted the ir place in the nationa l military structure confirm.ed 
d e finit e ly by s tatute and not by exec utive orde r. 42 
• 
Public r espon se to the h ea ring s was generally favor a ble , except 
for the time it h a d t a k e n since the e nd of the war to arrive at a national 
defe ns e organi zation to face the unc e rtainties of the po s t-war e ra. T he 
Nationa l Security Act was fin a lly vote d through Congress , and signed 
by th e Pres ident in July. 
The K eys tone of the n ew sys t em was th e N a tiona l S ecurity 
Council, d es igne d to generate basic policy r e cornmenda tions in all 
matte rs affe cting national security. Th e Pres ident was n ame d chair-
man of the b ody , and th e members include d th e Sec r e t a ry of State , 
the Sec r e t a ry of Defense , the thr ee service Secre t a ri es , the chairman 
41. Ibid., pp . 395-397. 
42. Ib id . , pp . 4 1 1- 414 . 
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of the N a tional S e curity R eso ur ces Board, and anyone the Preside nt 
might choos e to a~d from ti1ne t o tinJ. e . The C e ntr a l Inte lligenc e 
Age ncy was place d directly unde r the Council. 
The "Milita ry es tabli s hme nt" was compo se d of three D e parbne nts, 
':1-dmini s t e r e d by a civilian S e cre tary and sustaining a military service 
unde r the command of it s Chi e f of Staff, or Chi e f of Naval Op e rations. 
Common military dir ection was provide d by th e Joint Chie fs of Staff, 
con s i s ting of the military h ead s of the s e rvic es , and s upporte d by 
the Joint Staff . The S e cretary of D e f e n se h a d limite d a uthority, but 
.did h ave pote ntial powe r in his r esponsibility to sup e rvis e and 
coordinate budge t estima t e s . 
The t w o n.J.ilitary aspects of unification that h a d most trouble d 
the Navy - n aval aviation and the M arine Corp s - w e r e pro vided for 
by Cong r e ss in the law . N aval aviation was inte grat e d with the naval 
servic e as p a rt of the De partme nt of th e Nav y . The N avy was made 
gene r a lly responsible for naval r ec onnaissance , anti-submarine 
warfa r e , and protection of shipping. The Marine Corps was d esigna t e d 
to consis t of the Flee t Marine For ce of combine d arms , plus air, for 
service with the fl ee t in the s e i z ur e of advanc e d naval b ase s and for 
th e conduct of s u ch land op e rations as may b e essentia l for th e 
pro secuti on of a naval campa ign. 43 
The 1949 A1n endme nt to the N a tiona l S ec urity Act of 1947 was 
43. Milli s , e d . , Ame rica n Milita ry Thought,. pp. 471-472. 
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de signe d mainly _to clarify and enhanc e the authority of the Sec r e t ary 
of Defense . J ames Forre s t a l, the f i r s t Secre t a ry, r ecornmende d 
most of the changes in 19 48 after a yea r in office . 44 Th e Sec r e t a ry 
was giv e n 11dir ection, authority and c ontrol" o ve r th e military, the 
qualifying word "ge n e ral" b e ing remove d from the origina l act. Th e 
service d e partment s lo s t thei r status as exe cuti ve d e p ar tm ents to 
b ecome "milita ry" d e partme nts, and lost the ir secretaries 1 m emb e r-
ship on the N a tiona l S ec urity Council. A non-voting chairman was 
adde d to the Joint Chie f s of Sta ff and the nu)Tibe r of officers on the 
Joint Sta ff was inc r ease d from 100 to 210. Fina lly, the Sec r e tary of 
·D e f ense was give n a D eputy Sec r e t ary an d three Assistant Se creta ri e s 
to enable him to 'discharge hi s increase d r espon s ibilities . A Camp-
trolle r was authorized for the D e p a rhnent of De fense , a nd to each of 
the thr ee milita ry d e p a rtn1.ent s , increas ing the Sec r e tary 1 s control 
aver military budge ts . 45 
One v e ry important e l eme nt of the unification ques tion and N avy -
Air Forc e a ntipa thy was th e atomic bom b. In August 1945 n e ithe r 
s e rvic e was pre p are d to r eali ze the implications of th e weapon, but 
the Air Force seized on a tomic bom b s first, a s a natural extension of 
the ir strategic bom b ing d octrine . G e n e ral Arnold said in h is n1. e s sage 
44 . Arnold A. Ro gow , J a m e s Forres t a l (New York: The 
MacMilla n Company, 196 3 ) , pp . 304- 3 05. 





to the Pr esi d e nt in Novemb e r, 1945: 46 
The influe nce of atomic ene rgy on air p owe r can 
b e stated ve ry simply . It ha s made a ir powe r 
all - i m portant. Air powe r provides not only the 
b es t present m eans of striking an enerny with 
atomi c b omb s, but a l so the b es t protection against 
th e misuse of atomic explo s ives . 
Arnold added tha t th e Air Forces were the r ec o gni ze d masters of 
strate gic bombing, and rrthe a tomi c weapon ... · makes offe nsiv e 
and defensive Air Pow e r in a state of imm.e diate r eadine ss th e prima ry 
requi s ite of national survival. rr4 7 
Initia lly, no one in the military coulcf publicly t a lk as if the 
atomi c b01nb form e d a p ar t o f the country r s military-diplomatic ' 
. ars enal, as th e B a ru ch Plan was b eing urge d on the U nited Nations 
to pre v ent the us e of such weapons. The Air ·Force , how eve r, made 
extensive p l ans for including ato1nic bombs in it s arsenal, and 
claime d exclusive right s for the ir us e . 
In 194 7 , Pres ident Truma n a ppoint e d a co1n1nis sion uncle r 
T homas K . Finle tt e r to r e port on a ir policy in the nuclea r age . The 
resulting r e port was almost entir e ly ori e nted to the Air Forc e and 
paid little a ttention to naval aviation l argely b e cause the com1nis s ion 
consulte d a lmo s t exclu sive l y with Air Forc e offi cer s . Howeve r, as 
Walte r Mill is wr ote , rrth e re were many, not on l y in the N avy but 
46. Milli s , ed . , Ame ri can Military Thought , p. 454. 
4 7. Ibid., pp. 455-456. 
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outside it, who we r e not conv inc e d that all s trate gic wisdom r eside d 
in the young g e nerals of the Air For ce . '' 48 
The commi ss ion concluded tha t the military e stabli s hment rnust 
be built around the air a rm. "Of cours e ;" the report said, "an 
adequa t e Navy and Ground Force rnu s t b e maintaine d. But it is the 
Air Force and n aval aviation on which we mu s t mainly rely . O ur 
military security must b e bas e d on air po.we r . 1149 The commission 
said the Unite d States must hav e an a n arm in b e ing capable of 
deal ing with a po ssible a tomi c attack by J anuary 1, 19 53 . This 
argume nt was exploited by th e Air Force in its demands for a 
70- group bom b e r forc e , n eve r fully ac c e pte d by either the Preside nt 
· ·-. 
or Congress . James Forr es tal clung to the p :rinci p l e of "balanc e " 
in the c ountry's milita ry establishment, and had no d e sire to se e 
military poli cy distorte d into a primarily air pow e r strate gy . But 
to C ongress and the public, the idea of "Air Power" was romantic 
and provide d a simple , economic answ e r t o the proble ms of nationa l 
defens e . Uni ve rsal military training, essential to the Army ' s mobili-
zation p l ans , b egan to p a l e as massive air powe r woul d do away with 
any ne e d for it. 
Forres t a l h a d a l so b ee n trying to get the Joint Chi e fs of Staff 
to come to some agreement on the allocation of role s and missions 
of th e services, b e yond the p e rime t er s of th e N a tional Sec uri ty Act 
-
.,. 
48 . Milli s , Arms and the Sta t e , p. 207. 
49 . Ibid., p . 205 . 
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of 1947. From_Mar ~h 11 to 14, 19 4 8, th e Joi nt Chi e f s c onfe rr e d w ith 
Forr e s t a l at K e y W es t, Flo r ida . The g roup a gr ee d on th ree broad 
deci s ion s : 50 
l. For pla nnin g purpo ses , th e M a rine Corp s was to b e lirn ite d 
to f o ur div i s i ons w ith the pro v i s ion tha t the M a r i n es we r e not to 
crea t e "anoth e r l and a r m y. 11 
2. The Air Forc e r e c o gn i ze d the "right" of th e N av y t o pr ocee d 
with the d eve l op rne n t of weapons th e N avy con s ide r s essent ial to it s 
fun c tion b ut wi th th e pr ov iso the N av y w ill .n ot d eve lop a se p a r a t e 
stra t e gi c ai r forc e , th is fun c tion b e ing r ese r ve d to the Air For ce . 
3. The A ir Forc e .r e cogni ze d the right a nd n ee d for the N av y 
to p a rti cip a t e i rian a ll-out air c a mp a i gn. 
With an e y e t oward milita ry pre p a r e dness , the J oint Chi e f s 
d e cide d it was n eces s a ry to ask f o r an imme dia t e r e sto rati on of 
S e l ective S e r vi ce i n vi ew of the w orsening r e l a tion s w ith the So vie t · 
Union a n d the C zech c oup. 
The Chi e f s a l s o di sc u sse d th e u se of the a t omi c b omb and 
con .clude d tha t th e N av y c oul d not b e d e nie d the u se of the weapon , 
as long as it was u se d a ga in s t n aval targ e ts s uch as subma rine 
ba ses . F o rres t a l h a d g i ve n the N avy p errni s s i on to procee d with 
pla n s f o r it s g i a nt "flu s h--deck' ' a ir c raft c a rri e r, d e s igne d to e mploy 
50 . C . Jo seph B e r na d o and Eugene H . B ac on , Ame ri can M i l i t a ry 
Poli cy ( Har ri sbur g : The M i lita ry Se r v ic e Publishing C omp a n y , 
195 5 ) , p; 47 2 . 
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the large aircraft n e c essary to c a rry the h e avy atornic bornb s of th e 
tixne. 
Since 194 7 the Navy had worke d on a proj e ct to prove that 
atom ic w e apons could b e succe ssfully d e ploye d from carri e rs. 
While pla ns w e r e b e ing· p e rfe cte d for a j e t aircraft d e signe d 
sp e cifically for atomic bomb s , a s p e ci a l Na vy proj e ct worke d 
on t e chnique s to launch and r e cove r the Navy ' s 60, 000 pound P2.V 
aircraft from a carri e r. The N av y f e lt the only way to convinc e 
C ongr e s s wa s to d e v e lop a w eapons d e l ive xy 'syste m with e quipme nt 
a l ready on hand. The P2.V, nomiriali y a n anti- submarine warfar e 
l and - bas e d airplane , was the only Navy p l ane big e nou gh to carry 
the l a rge atomi c b01nbs the n in production, and b a re l y small enough 
to ope rate from an aircraft carrie r. By D e c e 1nbe r, 1948, th e Navy 
had a crude c a p a bility to d e live r an atomic b01nb from a r e gular 
op e r a tiona l c a rri e r. Two spe cial Composite Squa drons w e r e fonnally 
commissione d with atomic b01nb c a pability. 
T o prove the point Command e r John T . Hayw ard took off in a 
P2.V from the carri e r MIDWAY with a s e l e ct numbe r of gu e sts, 
including S e cre tar y of De f e ns e Louis Johnson, S e cre t a ry of the 
Air For ce W. Stua rt Sym ington, S e cre t a ry of th e Arm y Gordo n: Gray, 
S e cr e tary of the N av y Fra ncis M a tthews , and Cha irma n of the Joi nt 
Chi e fs of .Staff G e n e r a l Omar Bra dl e y . Haywa rd fl ew his group of 
- -
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critical observers from MIDWAY to Washington. 51 
The Key W es t Conference did not cornpl ete ly r e solve a ll differences 
on aton"lic weapons, and S e cr e tary Forre stal calle d anothe r confe r e nee 
for August, 1948, at the Naval War College in N ewport, Rhode I sland. 
Th e first question concerned ope rational control of atomic weapons, 
which th e Air Force said should b e given to th e Chief of Staff of the 
Air Forc e , acting for the Joint Chi e fs of Staff. It was agreed the 
Chi e f, Armed Forces Spe ci a l W eapons Proje ct, would r e port to the 
Chief of Staff of the Air Forc e , giving ope rationa l control to the Air 
Force. In return the Air For ce was obligate d to utili ze any strate gic 
bombing capabiliti e s th e Navy might d eve lop in planning and program-
ming strategic bombing missions . 52 
By the end of 19 48 the Navy h a d confirmed its cap a bility to 
us e atomic weapons and had r e c e ive d permission to build its "supe r 
carrie r" to mor e e ffectiv e ly d e ploy the weapons in the fl ee t. Th e 
Navy no l onge r fea red for the safety of the M a rine Corps, and for 
the tin1e b e ing n aval aviation seemed to b e secure as the focal point 
of naval power. Most of this wa s due to the efforts of James Forrestal , 
who was r e spon s ible for mobilizing th e service ' s efforts in the unifica-
tion battle and for establi shing nava l aviat ion as the b as is for mode rn 
naval strategic doctrine . This was accomplished with great difficulty 
51. Vincent Davis, 11 The Politic s of Innovation, " Monograph 
S eries in World Aifairs, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1966-67, The Social 
S cience Foundation and Gr a duate School of International 
Studies, Univ e r si ty of Denver , pp. 13 -17. 
52. Bernado and B acon , Ame rican Military Policy, pp. 472-473. 
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b e c a us e Cong r ess wa s i m presse d w ith the Air Force 's seemingly 
.. economi c al doctrine of s tr a t e gic bombin g with m a ss-des truction 
w eapons . 
Although th e Navy see m e d se cure w h e n Forre sta l l e ft the 
P e nta gon in March, 1949, late r that ye ar .the · ''B-36 controve rsy'' 
reop e n e d the bitter a nd viciously contes t e d b a ttle b e t wee n the Navy 
and the Air Forc e . Th e battle b e g a n inobtrusive ly in M a rch, 1948, 
wh e n Forres tal r e cornmend e d a supple m e nta r y d e f e ns e budge t to th e 
Pres ide nt, i n v i ew of r ecent eve nts in Europe . The Joint Chi e f s 
agr ee d on a 70-group b ombe r for ce for the Air Forc e , a flush-d e ck 




Army. While Cong r e s s con s ide r e d the milita ry's r e ques ts, the Air 
Forc e laun ch e d a strong campa ign for its bornbe r forc e , and infe rr e d 
that the Navy ' s carrie r had n e v e r b ee n form a lly recomme nde d by the 
Joint Chi e f s. S e cre t a r y of the N av y John L. Sullivan a n d Adrniral 
Louis E. D e nfi e ld, Chi e f of N a v a l Op e r a tions, we r e committe d to 
Forr e sta l' s mode r a t e a pproa ch a nd did little to c ounte r th e Air For ce 
claims . In pa s s i n g th e budge t for fi s cal yea r 1949, which b e gan with 
July, 19 4 8, Congre ss approve d s e l e ctive s e r vi ce , but not unive rsal 
military tra ining; it apportione d fund s for the first y e ar 1 s in c r e m e nt 
of a fiv e - yea r, 70- g roup Air Force prog rarn; and for the fir s t y e ar of 
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construction on the Navy's carrier . 53 
While Congress was con side ring the 19 50 budg e t, the Air Force 
continue d its publicity campaign, culminating in th e "leak" of an Air· 
Forc e pres entation earmarking 70 stra tegic t ar g e ts in the Sovie t Union 
within rang e of B- 36 ' s on non- stop r e turn flights from the North 
Am.erican continent . The Navy had attempted a publicity campaign 
of its own but could not match th e Air Forc e ' s fabu l ous l eak . Carl 
V inson, Cha irn1.an of th e Hous e Anne d S e rvices Committee and a . 
l ong-time Navy supporter , r eact e d veheineritly to this and other l e aks . 
V inson's com1nittee passed un aninJ. ous l y a s tatement introduced by its 
Chairman: 54 
The Arm e d Services Committee wants it clear l y 
unde rstood that if persons in the anne d 
s e rvices . or in th e ir employ continue to pass 
stateme nts to the pres s which are cal cul ated 
to d e precat e the activities of a sister 
service, and which, at th e same ti1n e : 
. j eopardize the national security, th e con1.n1.ittee 
will step in with a f ull - scal e inves tigation. 
In April , 1949 , newl y - appoint ed Secretary of Defens e L ouis 
A . Johnson recommended to t h e President that the Navy ' s flush-de ck 
carrie r b e cancelled. Johnson had canvas sed th e J .oint Chi e fs, who 
53 . P a ul W. Hamn1.ond, "Supe r Carriers and B-36 Bombe r s : 
Appropriati on s , Strategy and Politic s, " .A me ric an Civil -
Military Dec isions, H ar o l d Ste in, e d. (Tuscaloos a : University 
of Alabama Press for the Twe nti e th C e ntury Fund, 1963 ) , 
pp.47 8-482. 
54 . The N ew York Times, April 6, 1949, p. _l. 
-• • 
I ..I 
were two to one against construction of th e ship. Navy Secretary 
Sullivan had not b een cons ult e d b e fore Johnson 1nade his announc e m ent. 
John s on stoppe d construction only five days after the k ee l had b een 
laid, and according to one newspa p er account, "abandonment of the 
proje ct repr e s e nted a victory for the Air Forc e which d e mande d sole 
respon s ibility for strategic bombing .'55 
Johnson, 1notivate d by a d e sire to reduce military expenditures , 
sele cte d B- 36 1 s carrying atomic b01n bs as the country 's forc e 111 
being. Johnson was atte ntive to the views of G e n e ral Hoyt S . 
Vandenburg, Air Force Chief of Staff, who claime d the fundam e ntal 
purpos e of the supe r carrier dupli cated Air FQr ce strate gic bombing 
efforts. J ohnson agreed and orde r e d construction on th e carrie r 
stopped . 56 
S e cretary Sullivan imme diately pr e pared a l e tte r of r es ignation 
which summariz e d the Navy's attitude at this tim e : 57 
I am . . . very d eeply disturbe d by your action 
which so far as I know repr e s e nts the first 
atternpt e v e r m a d e in this country to pre vent 
the d eve lop1nent of a power weapon. The con-
viction tha t thi s will r es ult in a renew e d 
55. B e rnado and Bacon, .American Milita ry Policy, p. 471. 
56. Hammond, Ame rican Civil-Military D e cisions, pp . 494- 495 . 
57 . U . S. Congres s , Hou se of Repr esentatives, Arme d S e rvic e s 
Committee, Th e N a tional Defe ns e Prog ram: Unification 
and Strategy , H earing s b e for e the House Arme d S e rvic e s 
Committee, 8lst Cong., l st s ess . (W a shington: G, P, 0., 
1950) H e r einafte r r e f e rr e d to as Unifi cation and Strategy 
H ea ring s , pp. 622-623. 
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effort t o a b.oli s h th e M a rine Corp s and to 
tra nsfe r all naval a nd marine aviation e l se -
whe r e add s to my a n xie t y . 
How e v e r, e v e n of gr eat e r significanc e is th e un-
pr e c e d e nte d action on the p a rt of a S e cre t a ry of 
D e f e ns e in so drastica lly and arbitrarily cha ng-
ing and r e stricting the op e r a tiona l plans of a n 
arme d se rvic e ·w i thout con s ulta tion wi th that 
service . The con se quence s of such a proce dur e 
ar e far.., r e aching and c a n b e tragic. 
C011.gr es s m a n Vinson, the N av y 1 s tri e d and true fri e nd, appla ude d 
Johnson on th e floor of th e Hou se for a 11 coura g e ou s act. 11 Vinson 
had e arli e r oppo se d th e carrie r, b e li e ving that the 70- group Air 
Force WOLlld mo s t b e n e fit th e n a tion 1 s d e fens e e ffort. 58 
Soon afte r the carrie r c a nc e llation, rumor s b e g a n to circulate 
about the vulne r a bility of the B- 36 to fighter aircraft. Both Navy 
and Air Force fight e r pilot s hint e d tha t it could b e s hot dow n. In 
May, R e presentative J a m es V a n Z a ndt introdu ce d a r e solution 
before th e Hou se , calling for inve stigation of a ircraft contracts, and 
hinting of irre gula riti es in connection w ith pro c ur e m e nt of B-36 air-
craft. The s e l eak s appa r e ntly o r iginate d with C e dric Worth, Spe ci a l 
Assistant to the Unde r S e cr e t ar y of th e Navy. 5 9 
Congressman Vin s on s che dule d h e aring s of a, s e l e ct committee 
of his Hou se Arme d S e rvices COinmittee with h i m se lf as chairma n to 
inve stigat e V a n Z a ndt 1 s rmnor s , to examine the p erfor m anc e of the 
B-36 bombe r, to examine the roles of the Air Forc e a nd n a val 
58. Ibid . 
59 . Hamm on d, Ame ric an Ci v il-Mi lita r y De cisions , pp. 496- 4 97 . 
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avia tion to s ee if th e · ca n ce llat ion of the carrie r was sound, and to 
inves tigate th e role of th e Air For ce in s tr a t e gic bombin g and the 
overall e ffe ctive n ess of str a t e g ic bom b ing in g ene r a l. 
The first pha s e of the B- 36 h ea rings in Augu s t w as d e vote d to 
Air Force t estimony, pre s e nting a good pictur e of th e bombe r . The 
Navy w a s to pr e s e nt t es timony in Octobe r but in S e pte mbe r C a pta in 
John G. Cromrne lin, a naval a via tor, h e ld an inte mpe rate pre ss 
confe r e nc e a t which h e d a mne d unifi cation . In r e spons e , Se cre ta:r:y 
Matthe ws aske d s e nior n a va l offi ce r s for th eir vi ew s on d e f e ns e 
organi zation and n a val aviation . Vic e Admira l G e rald F . Boga n, 
Comma nde r of th e First Ta s k Flee t of the Pacific Flee t, responde d 
at l ength, expre s s ing unea siness w ith curre nt D e f e ns e D epartme nt 
policies . Admir a l Arthur A . R a dford, Command e r in Chi e f , U.S, 
Pac ific Fle et, and Admira l D e nfi e ld e ndor se d Admiral Bogan' s s e nti-
. m e nts by s a yi ng tha t the y r e presente d the f ee ling in th e flee t . 60 
The Boga n c orresponde n ce w a s l eal~e d to th e pre ss, and th e 
resulting publi c it y c a u se d M a tth ews to d e cide to r e pla c e Admiral 
D e nfie ld as Chi e f of Nava l Ope r a tions , although the Adm iral h a d 
be e n approve d by the S e n a t e for a s e cond tw o:.. yea r t e rn1. Ironica lly, 
most nava l officers di s truste d Admir a l De nfi e ld b e cau se of his a lle g e d 
support for th e B - 36 b e for e th e Join t Chi e f s . With somewh a t mor e 
found a tion, the offi ce r c orp s f e lt Sec r e t a r y M a tthews did not ade quate ly 
60. The N ew York Times , O c tobe r 4, 19 49, p. l. 
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advocate Nav y v_i ewpoints. 
Secretary Matthew s was the first Navy witne ss. He attempte d 
to bla me the whole disturbanc e within the Navy on discontented 
aviators . Vin son rebutted Matthews 1 statement saying that the 
Navy's r eaction was simply di s pleas ure with s eve re cutting of naval 
forc es . 6l The t estimony of the naval officers was l e d by Admiral 
Radford, who called th e B-36 a 11bad gamble 11 with national security 
d . . . d h d h • t . b b" 62 an cr1hC1z e t e t en ency to over - emp as1ze stra e g1c om 1ng . 
Other witnesses attacke d th e performance .of th e bombe r and c l aim e d 
that Navy fight e rs could inte r cept it. 
R ear Admiral Ralph A. Ofs ti e r e l ated strate gic bombing to 
· ·-
national objectives : 11War is an in strt.iment of national policy; conse -
quently the method of waging war must effective ly suppor t national 
policy. Military aims must b e consonant with political aims . The 
greatest d e fec t of the present conc e pt of strate gic bombing .. . is its 
contradictory r e l ation to fundamental ideal s, policies, and commitme nts 
of th e Unite d State s . 1163 Additional t es timony d e fend e d the concept ·of 
the flu sh-deck carrier and critici ze d the allege d economy of strate gic 
bombing. 
W. Stuar t Symington, Sec r e t a ry of th e Air Force , gave the Air 
61 . . Unification and Stra t egy Hearings, pp . 8-9, 22. 
62. Ibid., pp. Sl-52. 
63. Ibid., p.l85. 
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Forc e r e buttal. H e accused the Navy of attacking th e B-36 in orde r 
to pu s h its own budge t ary progran1s . G e n e ral Oma r N. Bradle y 
attacke d th e N avy ' s attitude towar d unification, saying that the 
"grie vances of a f ew offic e rs who w ill not accept the d ecisions of th e 
authorities es t a blished by law . have done infinite harm to our 
nationa l d e f ense , our po sition of l ead e r ship in world affairs, the 
position of our national policy, and the confide nc e of th e people in 
their government. "64 
The committee ' s r e port on the h ea rings did not s upport one 
s e rvice's views o ve r the othe r . In fact, the. r e port supported 
civilian control of the military and th e importanc e of Congress in 
matt e rs conce rning national d e f e ns e . Th e committee did not pass 
judgment on th e B-36, but said th e Air Force is th e b e st judge of a 
weapon d esigne d to carry out it s mission. The c01nmittee "deplore d" 
the manne r of cancellation of the super carrier, but d ecide d to with -
hold furth e r action on the matte r. 65 
In summa ry, the Navy l ost p a rt of its cas e , as c a ncellation orde rs 
on th e carrier stood . Howeve r the Navy ' s primary concern had b een 
pressing it s claim for a stake in the strateg1c r e taliatory mission. 
The Hou se committee supported this saying the Air Force was not 
synonymou s with th e nation's military air powe r . 
64. Ibid . , pp. 536-53 7 . 






The final conclusion to th e B - 36 controversy came with th e 
Korean War . Air pow e r was not a d e cisivefactor in th e war and 
Forre sial's doctr ine of balanced forces was upheld . In any case, 
compe ting strategic theories were pu she d aside in favor of imrne dia t e 
military s tr e ngth; in the wint e r of 1950-1951 Congress quadr uple d 
military a ppropria tion s from $15 billion to $60 billion . The Nav y 
got fund s to build m .ore aircraft carriers and th e Air Forc e b egan 
to push d e v e lopment of b e tte r j e t bombe rs . 
The Korean W a r and the subsequent d eve l opme nt of the rmo -
nuclea r weapons changed th e strategic fr amew ork of the po s t-war 
p e riod . The Air Forc e stress e d the d e t e rr ent asp ect of air powe r, 
and not it s 11 decisive 11 aspect. Th e Army and the Nav y d eve lop e d 
the do c trine of lin1it e d war, in the nuclea r context. 66 The Navy 
could a r gue that of a ll the se r vice s it h a d broa :lly dive r s ifi e d forces 
which c ould support one or mor e fun c tion;;t l missions: strategic 
r e t a lia tion, d e f e ns e of Europe , l imite d wa r, and d efense of the North 
Am e rican continent . The Air Forc e was prima r i ly suited for 
strategic d e t e rrence , whi l e the Arn1y was e quipp e d for the d e f ense 
of Europe and limit e d war . 6 7 
President Dwight D. E isenhowe r ' s adm.inis tra tion brought a 
p e riod of r e l a t ive stability to th e nation's 1nilitar y scene . Th e 
66 . Hun tington , The C ommon D e f e nse, pp. 409-410 . 
67. Ibid . , pp. 423-424. 
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unification issue was quiescent, a lthough the Air Force benefite d 
mo st from Ei senhowe r ' s '' N ew Lo ok 11 which place d greate r r e lianc e 
on nuclear weapons . Pres ide nt Ei senhowe r 1 s inte ntion was to balance 
economy and stability with the n ee ds of national strategy, and k eep 
d e fense spending unde r control. The nucle ar d e t e rr e nt was pr e -
dominant , and the military's limite d-wa:r; capability was cut b ack . 
The Army suffered most from this doct'rine, but the Navy faced . 
'd e t e rmine d Air Force opposition in building the n ew FORRESTAL 
cla ss of attack carrie rs. 
President Eis enhow e r sponsored some minor change s in d e f e ns e 
organization in 1953 in an effort to es tablish one cle ar channe l of 
comrna nd frorn the S e cre tary of D e f e ns e through the service sec retar-
ies. The S e cre tary was provide d with six additional Assistant 
S e cr e taries. The Secretary of D e fense was put in the chain of 
command from th e Pres ide nt to the unifi e d and specifi e d comrnands, 
and the Joint Chi e fs of Staff b e came a planning and advisory body, 
rathe r than a source. of command . 
The D e f e ns e R e organization Act of 19 58 wa s the final l e gislative 
step in post-war military r e organi zation and es tablished the bounds 
in which Secre t a ry of D e f ense Rob e rtS. McNa1nara ope rate d so 
effective ly during his term in offic e . The 195 8 act adde d to the 
Se cre tary' s role , sta ting that th e three service d e p a rtments were 
s e para t e ly orga ni ze d" but functioned "unde r the dir ection , authority 




were made "dir e ctly responsible to the Joint Chi efs , but th e Secr eta ry 
r emained in the chain of command. Most significantly, the Secretary 
was giv e n the power to transfer, reassign, abolish and consolida t e 
fun ctions a1nong the services. The Sec retary wa s given compl e t e 
discr e tion in assigning th e d e velopme nt and operational us e of n ew 
weapons or weapons syste ms to one or mor e of the s e rvices. 68 The 
respon sibi lity for mainta ining orde r in national s e curity affairs now 
rested square ly on th e S e cr e tary of D e f e ns e . 
The 1958 l e gislation profoundly affe cted the service secretarie s. 
According tci Eug e ne Zuche rt, forn1. er secretary of the Air Forc e , 
whe reas the s e rvice secr e taries we r e pr ev iously "respons ible for the 
'conduct of mil,itary op e rations, 1 their responsibility was now reduce d 
to th e 'organization, tr aining and e quipment' of the forc e s to b e 
employe d by the unified command s . 11 69 
Secret ary of Defense Thomas S. Gat e s, previously Secre t a ry of 
the Navy, b e gan the shake up at the P e ntagon, but the pote ntials of 
the r e organi zation measur e s wer e not realiz e d until the forceful 
p ersonality of Robe rt McNamara appe ar e d. President John F. 
Kenne dy acc e l e rate d th e tr e nd in th e military es t a blishme nt toward 
inte gra tion of r e l a ted functions, unifi e d con1.1nand structures and 
68. Burton M. Sapin, The Making of Unite d States Foreign Policy, 
(New York: Fr ede rick A. Prae g e r, 1966), pp. 148-1 49. 
69. Eug e n e M . Zucl~e rt, 11 Th e S e rvice Secretary: Has H e A Us eful 






centralized d ecision-making powers in the h ands of the S e cre tary of 
Defense . 
Until McNan!a ra, the military, traditiona lly resistant to change , 
either outlaste d or out flank e d previous civilian superiors who attempt-
ed to make maj or r e forn!S by means other than osmatic . Afte r the 
Secretary had b ee n i n offic e for some tirne, a Navy captain obs e rve d : 
11We who l ament e d idly the threat of the 1nilitary man on horseback 
now fac e a new twist, the civilian on hors e back . 11 70 
T he military ' s initial respons e to McNamara was l arge l y 
negative . The officers b e li eve d that the Sec retary and his civilians 
d i dn ' t unde rstand p e ople. McNamara ' s manag e rial innovations were 
p articul arly unpopular. Top military offic e rs in Washington were 
decidedly hostile to cost- benefit analysts; who ofte n recommende d 
against som e priz e d weapons syste1n of their own service. Officers 
found it incr edib l e that "youngsters, " many of the m PhD. ' sin 
economics, of all things, coul d have anything to contribute in the face 
of their ow:1 combat or military~ command experienc-e . 71 
Military attitudes have gradually changed over the past f ew 
years with th e realization tha t much of the dislike for McNa mara 
70. Paul R . Schratz, Capta in, U.S, Navy, 11 The Ivy- C l ad Man on 
H ors e b ack," U .S. Naval Ins titute Procee dings, Vol. 9 1, 
No . 3, March, 1965, p . 43 . 
71. Ste phe n Enke , ed . , D e fense M anageme nt (Englewood Cliffs, 




was p ersonal, and tb.at hi s new t echnique s wer e sound, In fact, 
military officers traine d in syste ms analysi s have "proven equally 
as proficie nt as their young civilian counterparts and the system is 
b e ing ext ended b e yond the Offic e of the Se cretary of D e f e nse through-
out the individual s e rvices . 
B e side s increa sed e ffici e nqr , McNamara's methods have 
t emp e r e d inte rs e rvice bickering. Programs, weapons and budgets 
cut across service l ines , all tightly coordinate d at the top in th e 
Secretary 's office. Su ch rival"ry as e xists is a produ c t of pride in 




BASES IN SPAIN 
An outstanding example of N a v y . and Congr e s s iona l influe n ce 
on nationa l p olicy w a s the d e f e n se a g r ee'm e nt signe d by the United 
States and Spa in on S e ptemb e r 26, 1953. Congre s s , through its 
l e gisla tive function, o f t en p a rticipa t es at l e ast pa s sive ly in civil-
military d ecision s , but vi rtually n e v e r s e ts a policy to b e adopte d 
by an administra tion. In thi s in s t a nc e ,· Congre s sional l e ade r ship 
brought about a chang e 1n firm a dm inistration policy, avidly as s i s t e d 
by N a vy and Air For ce offic e r s w ho succe s s fully by- pa s se d the ir 
civilian supe riors in th e De f e ns e D e partme nt. 
At th e e nd of World W a r II, Franc o's Spa in w as l a rge ly dis-
cr e dit e d in th e e yes of th e victoriou s alli e s, The ·san Franci s co 
Con f e r e nc e in June 1945 adopt e d a r e soluti on d e nying Unite d N a tions 
·mernbe r ship to 11 sta t es who se r egimes h a v e wage d wa r aga inst the 
Unite d Nation s , so long a s th es e r egim e s ar e in powe r. rr 1 At 
the Pot s dam Con f e r e n ce in July , the Unite d Sta t es , Gr eat Brita in 
and th e Sovi e t Un ion a gr ee d n o t to s upport a r e qu e st by Spa in for 
l. Unite d N a t i on s , Yea rb o ok of the U n it e d N a tion s 19 46- 4 7, 
D e p a rtme nt of Publi c Informa t i on , United N a tion s (Lake 





admi ss ion into the Unite d N a tion s. O n Mar ch 4, 1946, Th e Unite d 
Sta t es , Gr e at ·Bri t a in and F rance expre ss e d h op e tha t ''leading 
pat r ioti c a nd libe r a l-minde d Spani a rd s " would bring a bout a "pe ac e ful 
withdrawal" of Fra n c o, a nd offe r e d r ecogniti on a nd ec on orni c a ss i s -
tance to the m ovem e nt tha t could ac c ompli s h this objective . 2 
In Octobe r 1946 the Unite d Sta t e s announ ce d its policy tow ard 
Spain b e for e the Unite d N a tion s , sta tin g: oppo s i tion to Franco, 
.willingn es s to t a k e n ecessa ry a c tion a g a in s t Spa in unde r the Cha rte r 
should that count ry b ec ome "a threat to inte rnational p e ac e and 
security" and expres s e d contin u e d oppo s ition to admi s sion of the 
Franco r e gime to th e Unite d N a tion s a nd it s inte rnationa l age ncies . 3 
In D e c e 1n b e r, the G e n e ral A s s e mbly a dopte d a r e solution d e claring 
Franco a "gui lty p a rt y " with Hitle :r; and Mu ss olini in World W in II, 
and r e cornmend e d that m e mb e rs of th e Unite d N a tion s imme dia t e ly 
r e c a ll the ir a m b ass ador s and mini s t e rs from Spa in. 4 
None the l ess , th e po sition of Spa in in Eur op ean d e f e n se stra t e gy 
was, accordi n g to Professor Ruhl J. B a rtl e tt, " a special proble m 
2: U.S. Congress , S e n a t e , Committee on For e ign R e lation s , A 
D e c a d e of Ame ri c an For e i gn Policy, 8lst Cong. , 2nd s e s s~ 
S e n a t e Document No . 123 (Washing t on G. P. 0., 1950), p. 887. 
3. R aymond Denne t and Robe rt l(. Turne r, Do c ument s on A me rica n 
For e i gn R e l a ti ons , V o l. VIII, 1945-1946, World P e ac e 
Founda ti on (Prince ton: Prince ton Unive r s ity Press , 1948 ), 
pp . 8 8 9 --890. 




for Ame rican for e ign p oli cy . . "5 By 19 48, the policy of the United 
State s towa rd Spain began to cha nge , in spite of Pre sident Tn1man' s 
oppo s ition to the Franco gov e rnment. 
The Navy's desire to mainta i n a fleet pres e nce in the Medite r-
r anean prompte d int e r e st in clo se r r e l ations with Spain. I n the 
summer of 19 46, the Soviet Union, long cov e t ous of the Dardane lle s , 
tri e d to forc e Turke y to accept a n ag r ee·ment which would result 1n 
&Joviet domination of th e s traits . Truman 1 s advi so r s f eare d that 
succes s ful Sovie t d e mands on Tu rkey wo uld b e f o llowe d by infiltration 
and domination of Greec e , and a threat to British communication s 
with India . 6 Although no confront ation with the Sovi e ts to ok pla:ce 
ove r Turk e y in 19 46, the Truman Doctrine and military aid to Gr e ece 
and Turke y w e r e announc e d the following year. 
In August 19 46 Admiral Richard L. Conolly, Commande r of U . S. 
N aval Forc e s i n Europe and n a va l a d visor t o the S e cre tary of Stat e 
at th e P aris Peace Confe r ence , wrote Secretary of the N avy James 
Forr e stal that the pr esence of Arne rican n aval forces in the M e diter-
7 
ran e an would h ave a stabili z ing influen.c e in that p art of th e world. 
5 . Ruhl J . Bartlett, P olicy and P ower (N e w York: Hill and Wang, 
196 3 ) , pp . 254-255. 
6 . W a lt e r Millis, ed. , Th e Forr e stal Diari e s (N e w York: Th e 
Viking Press, 1951) , pp. 19 1-192. 
7. St e phe n G . Xydis, 11 T h e G e n esis of the Sixth Fle et, " U .S . 





Unfortunately, rapid d emobili zation and Pres ident Truman's d e sire 
for low d e f e ns e costs thr e atene d th e e ffe ctive presence of the Unite d 
States N a vy in Europe an waters as well as in th e P acific . Forres t a l 
and the Joint Chi e fs of Staff b egan to discuss capabilities as we ll as 
commitments. 
The N a vy had b een "showing the flag" in M e dit e rranean ports 
for almo s t a yea r, and the Ame rican fo.rces w e r e w e ll rec e iv e d . 
. On October l, . 1946, Secretary Forrestal announc e d the United State s 
inte nde d to maintain Ame rican units in the M e dite rr a n e an. Forrestal 
said units of the American fl ee t h a d b ee n in the M e dit e rrane an and 
would r e main the re to support Ame rica,n forc es in Europe, to carry 
out Ame rican policy and diplornac y, and for purpos e s of expe ri e nc e , 
mor a l e and e duc a tion of p e rsonne l of the Flee t . The p e rmanent 
commitment of U.S . naval forc es in Europe was a '1decisive new 
d eve lopm e nt ofAme rican policy," acco rding to W alte r Millis . 
Forrestal ' s announcem e nt form.ally linke d naval ope rations wi th · 
for e ign policy in the public mind, which had b een hi s intention. 8 . 
'the Sovie t Union strongl y objec t e d to the Ame rican naval 
presence in th e ir press , and these objections were echoe d by the 
Communist Party press in Gr eece , Ita ly and Franc e . 9 In spite of 
Soviet r ese ntme nt, the Sixth Flee t has remaine d i n the M e diterranean 
8. Millis, e d., The Forres t a l Diaries , p. 211. 
· 9. Xydis, U.S . Naval Ins titute Procee di n gs , Au g ust, 1958, 





as strong e vide nce of Am e rica n and NATO pre s e n c e. Howe v e r, 
maintenanc e of a cr e dible prese n ce r e quir es ba se ·and l ogistic s upport, 
whi ch l e d to N a vy s upport of Ame rican military in s t a lla tion s in Spain. 
By 1948 it w as clea r that th e N a vy and the Air Force w e r e still 
at loggerhead s , in spite of the N a tional S e curity Act of 194 7. Although 
many of the organi z a tiona l is s ues h a d b ee n s e ttl e d, the two s e r vices 
disagree d on the e mployme nt of a t omic w e apon s . Jame s Forres tal 
wrote in July tha t " th e a r e a of di sag r ee m e nt b e t ween the Air Forc.e 
and Navy Air is not n eces s a rily w ide but it is quit e d ee p." H e f e lt 
th e N a vy s till thought. the Air For c:e w a nte d control of all aviation, 
and the Air Forc e b e li e v e d tha t the Navy was tryin g to 11 encroach on 
th e strate gic a ir pr e roga tives of th e Air Force . ,,lO . The Air Force 
did not w ant d e f e n se fu n d s sp e nt on. a ir c r a ft carri e rs or on ov e r seas 
ba ses whi c h might t a k e mone y from. str a t e gic air powe r d e ve lopment. 
The N a vy w as c once rne d ab o ut the lack of Ame ric a n- controlle d 
bas es n e ar the wes t e rn a pproach es to th e M e dit e rranean. The 
Briti s h h a d b ase s a t Gibr a lt e r, Ya lta and Egypt, a nd th e N av y fea r e d 
Briti s h c o n trol of a M e dit e rr a n e an flee t unless the Unl.t e d States 
11 
establishe d b ases in the area . S e cre tary For restal s ympa thi ze d 
with the N a vy' s po s ition, but w as mainl y conc e rne d with Pres ide nt 
10. Milli s , e d., Th e F o rres t a l D ia ri es , pp. 464-466. 
11. The odor e J. Low i, "Base s in Sp a in, 11 Am.e ri can Ci v il-Milita ry 
Decis ions , H a rold Ste i n , e d. (Tus caloosa: · U n i ve r s it y of 
Ala bama P ress for th e T went ie th C e n tury Fun d, 1963), p. 674. 
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Truman 1 s insist e nc e on a $15 billion budge t c e iling for d e fens e which 
-
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in s iste d was too low. 
The Navy's e fforts toward b e tt e r r e l ations with Spa in could not 
have succeeded without the so-called 11 Spanish Lobby. 11 Franco was 
conce rne d that Spain would b e the only W es t e rn European country 
not r e c e iving aid frorn the Unite d States . Charles Patrick Clark, 
an Ame rican, was e ngage d as a lobbyist on beha lf of th e Spanish 
g;overnme nt. Support for b e tt e r r e l ations with Spain eventually came 
from fivegroups: first, influe ntial lay and clerical l eaders of the 
Catholic Church, including S e nator Pat McCarran; s e cond, an anti-
Communist group which considered Fra~co the stronges t anti-:-Commu-
- -
nist l ea d e r in Europe ; third, th e N a vy group, including s e veral 
Admirals and the Sec r e tary of th e Navy; fourth, an essentially 
R e publican anti -Truman group, l e d by S e nator Robe rt Taft; and finally, 
?-gricultural inte r es ts fa v oring cre dits to Spain for th e purchas e of 
Am e rican agricultural products. 12 
By 19 49 the Navy was b ec 01ning increasingly concerned about 
acquiring b ase faciliti es near the Straits of Gibralter. Admiral 
Conolly had made r epe a t e d r e ques ts for p e rmission to t ake fl ee t 
unit s into Span i sh port s for courtesy visits since 1947; finally, in 
Se pte 1nbe r, the Pres ident authorized a visit to El Fe rrol, on the 
Atlantic side of Gibr a lter . Am e rican ships e nte r e d a Spa ni sh port 
-




on Septem_ber 3 for th e first time since the Spanish civil war , and 
remaine d for fiv e days. Admiral Conolly called on G ene ral Franco 
at his nearby sumn"ler h eadquarters , accornpanied by a numbe r of 
Navy, Army and Air Forc e flag and general officers . 13 In Octobe r, 
b e fore the Hous e Arme d S ervices Committee , the Admir a l presented 
the Navy's case for bases in Spain. ''The strategic importance of 
th e Ibe rian P enin s ula is uniqu e ly evide nt , II h e said. 11 The more 
friends you have on your flank the b e tt e r . ,,l 4 
Adiniral For res t Sherman, appointed Chief of Naval Operations 
after Admiral Loui s D enfi e ld was r e mov e d, r e ques t e d p ermission to 
include Spain in a tour of Europe, but was turne d down . In the mean-
time, unit s of th e Six th Flee t paid a call to Barcelona, on the Mediter -
ranean s ide of Gibralte r. The Air Forc e b ecame interes t e d in Spain 
in 1949 . S ecretary Forres t a l e ncourage d the -"'?ir Force to look b e yond 
collaboration with the British in the es t a blishment of strategic b ase s 
in Europe, as h e f eared overconcentr a tion of American Forces in 
Brita in could mean lo ss of access to the Middle East. Be caus e of 
pos s ible political r amific a tions, th e Air Force initially p asse d over 
Spain and concentr a t ed on North Africa, although pote nti a l support 
15 for the pro-Spanish e l e inents r emaine d . 
13. The New York Times, September 4, 19 49, p. 4 . 
14. Ibid., _ O ctob e r 13, 1949, p. l. 
15. Lowi, American Civil-Military D eci sions, pp: 478-479. 
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Congress follo we d Admiral Conolly's l ead in the fall of 19 49 and 
a numbe r of congressional "junke t s; , were under t aken . Senator 
McCarran d eparte d on Septe mb e r 14, announcing his inte ntion to 
talk to Franco about possible loans . Preside nt Truman r e torted that 
the Senator was going as a private citizen and did not r e present the 
adminis·t~ation. 16 A subcornmittee o£ the Sena t e Appropriations Commit-
t ee heade d by S e nator Denni s Chave z visited Spain in November, and 
announced that full diplomatic relations should be restor e d with Spain, 
and some sort of economic aid should b e coi1side r e d . 17 The Truman 
administration r e maine d unmove d"in its unfri endly attitude toward the 
Franco government, in spite of congressional press ur e . It should be 
pointed out tha t Secretary of State Acheson was not unalterably opposed 
to Franco; h e was loyal to th e Presid e nt, and f e lt a change in attitude 
toward Franco at that time would j eopardi ze successful n e gotiation 
of the North Atlantic Treaty. In May 19 49 Acheson said that the United 
Nations r ecomme ndation on the withdrawal of am b as sad or s was 
important mainl y becaus e it had "be come a symbol" to the Western 
democracies . 18 Also, th e United Sta t e s had n ever br~ken diplomatic 
r e l ations with Spain; Truman had withdrawn his ambassador in 19 45 , 
and a charge d'affair es headed the American mission in Spain. 
16. The N ew York Times , S e pte mber 16, 1949, p . 3. 
17. Ibid ., Novemb e r 2, 19 49, p. 9. 
18. Ibid . , M ay 12, 1949, p . l. 
• 
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Congress continue d to press th e Tnm.l.an adnl.inistration to restor e 
relations with Spain as the second s e ssion of th e Eighty-fir s t Congress 
opened in J anuary 19 50. L ead by S e nator McCarran, the Senate in 
August approved a $100 million loan to Spain, by a vote of 65-lS. 
A House-Senate Conference approved a $62. 5 million loan, which was 
ti ed to the President's Point Four appropriation r equest. Although 
President Truman had denounced the initial Senate bUl, he buckled 
under to maintain Point Four. In signing the G eneral Appropriations 
bill on S e pte mbe r 6, Truman announced that h e refused to consider th e 
Spanish loan "mandatory" and that the nl.one y would be loaned "whenever 
such loans w ill s e rve the interest of the United States in th e conduct 
of fo reign r e l ations . "19 
The Navy took no public part in the Congres s ional drive to attain 
clo ser ties with Franco during this period; In July 1950 Senator 
McCarran h e ld a meeting attended by a few senators and military 
r epresent a tives. Apparently th e military officers developed the 
strategic argurnents to be used by the congressmen in the Hou se and 
Senate. McCarran reported on this m ee ting in a Saturda y Evening 
Po st article, putli s h e d th e follow ing April, and describe d the dilemma 
facing the nl.ilitary~ 20 
19. Ibid., Septembe r 7, 1950, pp. l, C-36. 
20. Pat M c Carran, "Wh y Shouldn't the Spanish Fight for U s?, 11 
Saturday Evening Post, April 28, 19 5 1, quot e d in Low i, 
Ame rican Civil-Military Decisions, p. 686. 
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Politica l d e cisions b e lon g to the State D e p a rtme nt 
and the White H o u se , and the Pre side nt had m ade it 
cle ar he wante d no r e lations with Spain . This. 
left t e chnical m e n in a spot. They could not 
openl y advocate a poli c y which fright e n e d th e ir 
superior s , let alone contradict the Pres ide nt, ye t 
their blue prints did just tha t. Unofficially, the 
l owe r eche lon m a d e know n its views . The m ee ting 
in my office was just one of many in Washington . 
L ess than two month s l a t e r, the G e n e ral Ass e mbly of the 
Unite d N a tions formally r e p eal e d the portion of it s 1946 resolution 
on Spain r e comme nding th e withdrawal of ambassadors, with Ame rican 
support. Most of the supporte r s of the earl i e r r e solution had since . 
disr e garde d it anyw ay. Pre side nt Truman, how e ve r, appeared 
adamant in hi s opposition to the Franco governme nt until Dece.mbe r 2 7 , 
when h e announc e d the non1ination of Stanton G riffis as Ambassador to 
Spain . G riffi s h a d b e en the Am e rican Ambassador to Poland until 
1948, whe n h e was transfe rr e d to Egypt. He told Jame s Forre stal 
in May 1948, whe n h e was offe r e d the Egyptian post, that h e would 
have pr e f e rr e d Spain . G riffis s a id h e found it difficult to unde r s tand 
how the Unite d States could talk about the control of the Eastern 
M e dite rra n ean and ignore the othe r points, since the r e was no 
Ambassador in Spain . 2 1 
During the long Congre s s ional d e bates , although Trmnan ' s 
publ ic policy toward Spa in did not change , the State a nd Defense 
Depa rtme nt s we r e w orking on a policy pap e r for Spa in, w hich inc l ude d 
2L Milli s , e d., Th e Forres t a l Dia ri e s, p. 445·. 
- --· 
n1.ilitary assessment s of the n ee d for American bas es in that country. 
T his pape r, n eve r made public, was pr e sente d to the National S e curity 
C ouncil in J anuary , 1951. Griffi s was dispat ch e d with instructions to 
inves ti gat e th e po ssibility of negotiations for b ases , and the Ambassadors 
in France a nd Gr eat Britain were instructed to sound out th e attitudes 
of Ame rican alli es toward including Spain in plans for the d e f e nse of 
Europe . 22 
The military's inte r es t i n Spa nish b ases h a d not b ee n publici zed 
by mid-1951, wh e n Admiral She rn1.an r ece iv e d p e rmission from the 
President to visit Madrid on an official European tour . She rman had 
be en active in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pres sing for military arrange -
m ent s with Spain, s inc e assigne d as CNO in 1949 . Whe n the Admiral 
left for Europe on July 16, the D epartme nt of D e f e ns e said only tha t 
he was tr aveling to familia ri ze hims e lf with European military con-
ditions prior to a NATO d e f e n se ministers m ee ting in S epte mbe r . 
The n on July 18, D e an Aches on, S ec retary of State , announc e d one 
important face t of Admira l Sherman's trip. The Se cr e tary said: 23 
Milita ry authoriti es ar e 1n g e neral agre ement tha t 
Spain i s of strategi c importance to th e gene r a l . 
d e f e ns e of .W e s t e rn Europe . As a natura l corollary 
· to this g e n e r a lly accepted conclusion, t entativ e 
and exploratory conv e r sations hav e b een unde r-
22. L owi , America n C ivi l- Military D ecisions, pp. 690-691. 
23. D ean Ach e son, I!U . S. B egins Conversations on Spain 1 s Role 
in European D e f ense , 11 Press Conference of July 18 , 1951, 
U.S . D e p a rtment of State. Bull e tin, V ol. 25, No . 631, 
July 3 0, l 9 5 l , p. l 7 0. 
-· -
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t aken with t he Spanish G overmnent with th e so l e 
purpose of ascertaining what Spain might b e will-
i ng and able to do which would contribute to the 
strengthening of th e conunon defense against 
po ss ible aggression . 
Acheson went on t o say that the United States had b een unabl e to come 
t 9 agreen1ents wi t h Gr e.at Britain and France over a possible role for 
Spain. He added that any unde r s t anding that might be r eache d with 
Franco woul d " supplernent our b asic policy of building the defens e 
strength of the W est," and tha t the co untry' s main commitment wa.s 
to NATO , The following day President Truman acknowledge d that 
his administration had officially changed. it s policy toward Spain, as 
a r esult of "advice by the D e partment of D e fense , " 24 
A good deal of work r emain e d, howev e r, b e fore thes e bases 
would b ecome more than political goal s. A militar y survey t ean1 
h eaded by an Air Force g ene ral spent several month s in Spain and 
r e po rted somewhat p essirnistically in J anuary . The t eam r ecognized 
th e s t rategic need for air and naval b ases in Spain , but ques tione d if 
these bases would b e availabl e in the event of war . 25 M eanwhil e , the 
Air Force was busy building bases in North Africa . Th e Navy conti nued 
to visit Spanis h ports in the M e dit e rranean arid th e Atlantic, m eeting 
with enthus ia s tic r e ceptions, and lavishing complirnents on the Spaniards . 2 6 
24. Th e N ew York Times , Jul y 20, 19 5 1, p . 1. 
2 5. Ibid., J anuary 4, 1952, p. 1. 
26. Ibid . , January 11, 19 52, p. 4, and Jun e 28, 1952, p. 13 . 
-· -
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Fina lly, on M arch 12, 1952, Secreta ry Acheson announced th e formal · 
opening of n e gotiations . N ew l y-appointed Ambassador Lincol n M ac V eagh 
was to b e assiste d in the n e gotiations by a special milita ry advisory 
team . 27 
Pres ide nt Dw ight D . Ei senhower 1 s ina ugura tion did not slow the 
n egotia tion s . Ambassador J am e s C . Dunn, MacVeagh 1 s replac ement, 
said on April 9, 19 53, that 11 we want the b ases to s tr e ngth e n the cordial 
relations exis ting b e t ween our t wo countries , 11 which are importa nt to 
t h e d e f e n se of W est e rn Europe . 28 
Finally, on Septembe r 26, 1953, Ambassador Dunn and Spanish 
For e ign Minister Alberto Martin Artajo signe d thr ee bi l ateral ag r ee -
m e nt s calling for th e con s truction and u se of military facilitie s by the 
Unite d Sta t es in Spain, economic aid, and a mutual defense assistance 
agreement. Th e bases we r e to r emain unde r ?panish juri s d i ction , 
· unde r the Spa nish flag and cornrnand . 29 
T h e Navy ' s r eward for six years of effor t was a b ase at Rota , 
n ear C a di z on the Atlantic side of Gibra lte r , form a lly oc cupi ed in 
1958 . Thi s insta llation continues to serve as a fu e ling and supply 
2 7. D ean Acheson, "Negoti a tion s With Spain on Military F aciliti es, rr 
Press C onference of March 12 , 1952, U.S . Department of 
State Bulle tin, Vol. 26, No . 665, March 24, 1952, p . 450. 
28 . The N ew York Times, A pril 10, 1952, p. 4 . 
29. "Ag r ee1nent s Conclude d wi th Spain , 11 Press r e l e ase 5 19 dated 
S eptembe r 2 6 , 195 3, U.S . D epartme nt o_f State Bulle tin, Vol. 
29, No. 7 45, O ctober 5 , 1953, pp. 435-436 . 
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base and as th e · main point of entry for naval t ransport a ircraft frorn 
th e Unit e d Sta t es to the M e diterranean . The es t ablishm ent of a nuclea r 
submarjne bas e .a t Rota is a mo re r ecent d evel opnt e n.t. The Rota 
insta lla tion was inte nde d to b e th e h e adquarters of the Six th Flee t. 
This did not deve lop, · a ·s the N avy d e v e lope d logis ti c fa cilities in . 
N apl es , Ita l y . 
· Congre ss, the Trurnan admini s tration and the so-calle d "Spanish 
Lobby'' were a ll involve d in the controve rsy ov e r r e l a tions with Spain 
afte r World War II. Th e military -- particulariy th e Navy- played an 
important p a rt in ch anging President Truman 's mind, but not the 
major p a rt . What is important to this study is the N avy 's coop e ration 
- -
with Cong r es s on a n unofficial b asis, h e lping Congre s srnen and 
Senator s to pre pare the ir state 1nent s for com1nitte e h ear ings. The 
Navy did not contribute dir ectly to their case i ? ope n t estimony . N avy 
. Secre t aries John L. Sulli van and Francis .P. M a tthews suppo rte d the ir 
military subordinates , as did D efens e S e cr e t a ri e s J ames Forre s t a l and 
.. Loui s A . Johnson . Whe n G e orge C. M arsh a ll b e came S e cre t a ry of 
D e f ense in 19 50, h e di d not hinde r th e milita r y ' s effo rt s although h e 
did not ac ti ve l y suppo rt the m. 
Pres s ur e s frorn Cong r ess and "advice " from the D e fense Depart-
m ent notwith s tanding, the 1nost intp or t an t f ac t or in Truman ' s p olic y 
change was h is d e cision in 1951 to concent rate the country ' s d e f ense 
effort on Europe and n egoti a t e a t ruce in Ko rea . ~he milita ry was 
a ble to convince t he Pr esid ent tha t naval and air bases in Spain wou ld 
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enhance the d e fense effort in We stern Europe . The inordina t e l e ngth 
of ti1ne it took th e Administration to a nnounce its policy and comple t e 
negotiations was large ly dti e to atte mpts to avoid offe nding Ame rica's 
NATO a llies , and Franco's insiste nce tha t Spain shQ uld retain 






THE NAVY LOBBY 
To compe t e in th e compl ex mili e u of mode rn government the 
military h as b ee n forc e d to abandon its traditional disdain for politics. 
While not "political" in the commonly accepted sense, the Navy h as 
gr eatly exp and e d and r e fin e d its activities in this area. By bur eau c-
rati z i ng thei r l obbyingactivities, Naval -offi ce rs ar e able to think 
the y ar e carrying out the ir r esponsibilities to Congress and the 
Exec utive without e ngaging in politics . . 
B e for e World War II, a ssistance to Congres-s was handle d 
through the Offi ce of the Judge Advoc a t e G e n e ral, and consisted 
l arge ly of providing the answers to l egal ques tion s ·s uppli e d by 
congre s smen. 1 Any lobbying was c a rried out by the semi-autonomous 
bur eaLlS dir ectly with Congress . 
Th e s y s t em fir s t changed in 19 56, when the Offic e of L e gislative 
liaison was take n from the Judge Advocat e G e n e ral a nd put directly 
unde r th e S e cre t a ry of th e Navy. A r ear adm ira l was named Chief 
of L egis l ative Liaison , "directly responsible to the S e cr e tary of the 
1. Juliu s Augustus Fur e r, R ear Admiral, U.S. N avy (R e tired) , 
Administration of t he Navy D epartrnent in World W a r II 





Navy for legisla tive matters and congressional r e la tion s (except 
appropriatio~s m a tte r s ) . 112 In 1957 the Secre tary of D e f e ns e Jnoved 
t o centralize congressional r e l a tions unde r his control , by creating 
an Assistant to the Sec r e tary of D e f ense (Le gislative affairs ) . In 
19 59 the D e f e nse D e partm e nt and Congress reduc e d the numbe r of 
p ersonnel ass ign e d to each s e r vice ' s l e gis l ative liaison offic es. 
In spite of the s e s eeming r es trictions the Navy ' s l egis lative 
l iaison activities continue d unimpair e d b e c a u se " l egis l a ti ve l iai son " 
b y d e finition does not include approp riati~ns bill s . Budge tary matte rs 
ar e assigned to the Offic e of the Comptrolle r, both in the s e rvice 
d epartments and a t the l evel of th e b <;! partinent o£ D e fense . In 196 0 
t he t itle of the .Office of L egis l ative L iai s on w a s changed to t he 
Offic e of L egis l ative Affai r s , and its authority expande d to i nclude 
liaison with the exec utiv e branch of th e gov e r nment and non-govern -
menta l agencies, as we ll as with Congr es s . 3 T he Office of L egis l ative 
A ffairs b ecam e the Navy ' s primary l obbying age ncy . 
N avy publi c r e l a tions has origins as obscure as l eg is l ative 
affairs . U nti l 194 1 publi c r e lations was a bran.ch of naval int e llige nc e 
staffe d mainl y by civilians . Sec r e tary of the Navy F r ank Knox 
d esigna t e d the Offi ce of Publi c R e l a tions to b e dir ectly r espon s ibl e 
t o the Sec r e t a ry, and every Navy unit was to hav e an offic e r assigned 
2. SECNAV Instruction 5430. 26A of J uly 15 , ~ 956 . 
3 . SECNAV Ins tru c tion 5 43 0 . 26B of June l l, 1960 . 
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to h andl e public r e lations and informa tion. In 1944 J a m .e s Forres t a l 
was naxne d Secre tary of the N avy , and b e gan hi s cam p a ign to urge 
naval officers to inform the public about the N avy . In 1945 he organized 
a n ew Offi ce of Public Informa tion a nd convinc e d Congr e ss to approve 
a cat egor y of spe cia l duty publi c informa tion offic e rs. 4 Secr e tary of 
th e Navy Fra n c i s P. Matthe~s in 1950 created the bille t of Chi e f of 
Informa tion , a r ea r adnl.ir a l assigne d to work jointly for the S e cr e tary 
and for th e Chi e f of N aval Op e r a tion s . 
In addition , th e N a vy from time to tim e h as organ i ze d ad hoc 
groups r espon s ible to the Sec r e t a ry and to the Chi e f of Nava l Op e r a tions 
for organi zing the se rvice ' s political strategy. The fir s t of such 
groups consiste d of a f ew J;nemb e rs of the G e n e ral Boa rd who took it 
upon themse l ves to organize th e Navy ' s te s timony b e for e th e Woodrum 
C ommittee in 1944 . S ec r e t a ry Forre stal appa:ently had this group 
i n mind in Octobe r 1945 when h e organize d the S ec r e tary ' s C ommitte e 
on R esea r ch on R e organization - know n w ithin the D e p a rtme nt as 
SCORER - :.:mde r Vic e Admiral Arthur A . R a dford . The commi tte e 
wa s give n the r e sponsibility to pr e p a r e th e Na vy 's position a nd strate gy 
for the unifi cation h e arings that we r e about to b e gin . SCORER disba nde d 
aft e r t h e p assage of the National S ec urity Act of 1947, in the b e li e f 
that the unific a tion s truggle had b een s e ttled . Two of th e or igina l 
m emb e rs of the cominittee, R ea r Adinirals Rob e rt Carney and Forre st 
4 . Vincent Davis, Th e Admir a l s Lobb y ( Chap e l Hill: The 
Univ e r s it)r of North C a r olina Pr ess , 1967), pp . 267-273. 
• • 
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Sherman , l ater s e rv e d as Chief of N aval Op erations, and Adn1.iral 
Radford served as Chainnan of the Join t Ch iefs of Staff. 
The functional s uc cesso r to SCORER was the Organiza tiona l 
Poli cy and R esearch Divi sion (Op- 23 ) in the Offi ce of the Chi e f of 
Naval Ope rations, organiz e d by Admiral Loui s E . D e nfi e ld and h eaded by 
Captain Arle igh A. Burlce . Op-23 was form ed in D e cember 1948 
and prepar e d the Navy's presentation to. the Hous e Arm e d S e rvices 
.Committee in the "B - 36 controve rsy" of 1949. 5 During the h e arings, 
Sec r e tary Matthews orde red the Navy Inspector G eneral to inves tiga t e 
Op-23. Nothing incriminating wa s discovered, but the division 
was abolishe d by Admiral Forres t She r .man, the new CNO . 
Captain Burke 's activiti es in Op- 23 n e arly cost the N avy one 
of it s most gifted l ead e rs when Sec retary Matthews trie d to pr e v e nt 
Burke ' s se l e ction for pr01notion to R e ar Admiral. R e publicans 1n 
th e Hous e were alread y unhappy ov e r the Pres ide nt's summary 
dismissal of Admiral Denfi e ld as Chief of Naval 9pe rations. Th e 
Pre side nt hi1ns e l£ r eso l ved the matte r by adding Burke ' s name to th e 
Re a r Admiral promotion li s t. 
The n ext special agency c r eated in the CNO's office was the 
Long- Range Objectives Gr oup, organize d in 19 55 and still functioning 
unde r the Dir e ctor, Navy Progran1. Planning . This group was to 
5. P a ul V! . Ha1nmond , 11 Super Car riers and B-36 Bomb e rs," 
Am e rican Civ i.l-Milita ry D e cision s , Harold Ste in, ed . 
(T u scal oosa: Th e University of Alabama Press for the 
T wentieth C entury Fund, 1963) , pp. 525, 548 . 
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proj e ct l ong-te rm_ r e quir e m.e nts for the Navy. 6 A nurnb e r of r e lated 
pla nning and evaluation groups were orga nized by Admiral Burke 
durin g his tour as Chi e f of Naval Ope rations from 19 55 to 1961. They 
include the Naval Long-Range Studies Project, the Naval Warfare 
Analysis G ro up and the Ope rations Evaluation Gro up. Their functions 
are coordinate d unde r the Navy Program Planning Offic e , although 
th e t itles change p e riodically. 
The Progress Analysis G roup, establi she d in 19 50 in the 
CNO' s office, was one ad hoc group that did-b e corne involv e d i n 
congressional l obbying . They p ut ' togeth e r the "CNO S e a Power 
Seri es , 11 consi sting of film strips, motion p ict ures , and illu strate d 
l ecture s, used in the annual presentat ion to C ongre ss and wide l y 
d eseminate d arn.ong Navy and Naval R e s e r v e Units- and se l ect groups 
of civilians. 7 The Prog r ess Anal ysis G roup flour ishe d under Admiral 
Burke as a vigorous exponent of the N a vy '_s views ,- and h as sinc e b een 
absorbed b y the Program Planning Office . 
The Army and th e Air F orce have a l so i ncreased public and 
l egis l at i v e activities since World War II with t wo offic es a t th e 
hi gh e s t l ev e l dir e c tl y r e sponsible t o the servi c e sec r e tary . Professor 
Huntington holds inte rs e rvic e rivalry responsible for this 
6. U.S. , Uni t e d State s G o ve rnm e nt O rgani z ation Manual 196 7-6 8 , 
Nationa l Archive s and R e cor ds S e rvic e , R e vis e d Jun e 1, 1967 
(Washington : G . P . O . , 1967), PP: 16 1, 16 8 . 






Inte rservice competition wa s a justification for, as 
well as a caus e of, s e rvic e political activities. 
Traditionally, and aga in immediate ly afte r World 
War II, service app e al s to the ir officers to b e public-
r e lations conscious stresse d the c l ose inte rr e lation 
of political and .milita ry affairs and the g e n e ral 
responsibility of milita ry officers to enlighte n 
the public on the n e eds of national security . 
Although 11interservice c.ompe tition: 11 i s a qui es c e nt issue 1n 
military politics today, the services ' l egislative and public affairs 
activities have not abate d. Each servi ce maintains offices in 
Washington to k eep m e mbe rs of Congr e ss informed and to solicit 
their inte r e st in particular proble rns - in short, to do many things 
done by conve ntional 11lobbyi sts 11 or pre~ sure. groups . 9 
There is a distinct diffe renc e b e tween a servic e lobby and 
a lobbyi st repres e nting private industry . The miiita ry offices 
responsible for legislative liaison are directly r e spon s ible to 
their r e s p e ctive service secre tari e s, and the Assistant to the 
Secretary of De fense (Legislati ve Affairs ) coordinate s a ll service 
l egis l ativ e activiti e s . Since the O ffic e of the S e cre tary of Defense 
controls all liaison activiti e s and obviously refle cts adrninistration 
views, the service s do not pr.e s e nt truly inde p e nd e nt programs to 
Congress. 
8. Samue l P . Huntington, 11lnte rse rvice Compe tition and the 
Politi cal Roles of th e Arm e d S e rvic e s, 11 Total War and Cold 
War, Harry L. Cole s, e d. (Columbu s: Ohio State University 
Pres s, 1962) , p. 188 . 
9. J a ck Raymond, Powe r at th e Pentagon (N ew York: Harpe r & 
Row, 196 4 ), p . 202. 
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The A ss i s t ant to the S ec r e t a ry of D e f e n se (Legis l a ti ve A ffair s ) 
is r es p ons ible f or th e c o or dination of D e p a rtment of D e f e n se a c tiv i t ies 
conc e rni n g cong r es siona l li a i son i ncludin g fu rnishing informa tion, 
pr e p a r a tion of w itne ss es , l egi s lati ve i n vestigat ion s , and the 
l e gi s l a t ive prog r a m . of the d e p art ment. No s e r vi ce a ttempt s to 
initia t e l egis l a tion on it s own, a nd the l e gis l a ti on i n itia t e d b y th e 
D e p a rtment of D e fe n se i s r e f e rr e d to the s e r vi ces f or c omxne nt 
in th e ir p a rti c ula r area s of inte r es t. 
The r esp or1s ibi lities of th e N avy ' s Ch1e f of L egi s l a tive 
Affair s p a r a lle l tho se of the Ass i s"t a nt to the S ec r e t a r y , but ar e 
r e stri ct e d to th e D e p a rtme nt of the N a vy. Hi s offi c e c oordinate s 
and sup e rvises the De p a rtme nt' s l e gi s l a tive pr og r a m, including 
the pre p a r a tion of r e port s a nd t es timon y, and processe s r e pli es 
to congressiona l inquiri es a nd inves tiga tions . The o ffi ce i s 
respon s ible f o r the r e l e a se of class ifie d information to C ongr e ss. 10 
Milita ry offi ce rs r esponsible for congress iona l r e l a tions 
op e r a t e in t w o a r eas , "le gi s l a t i v e " and 11lia ison. 11 The l e gislative 
functio n in c ludes ass i s ting Congressrne n or S e n a tor s , or m e xnbe r s 
of comm itt ee s t a ff s , in the pr epa r a tion of b i ll s c once rnin g the 
milita r y . A r e l a t e d du ty i s t o br ief milita ry p e r sonne l who ar e to 
t e stify b e for e c ong r ess iona l committees , and to pro v ide informa tion 
to committee mernb e r s . A go od exaxnpl e o f l egis l a ti ve liai son i s the 
10. U nit e d States G ove rrnn e n t O rgan ization Manual 19 6 7-6 8 , 
p. 18 1. 
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information provided to 1nen1be rs of Congress 111 19 50 during the 
h earings on r e l ations with Spain, d esc ribed in Chapte r V. 
The liaison job is broade1· and more difficult to define. The 
s e rvices provide "assistance 11 t o Congressmen and S e nators, r anging 
from colle cting information to orga nizing and furnishing transportat ion 
for official trips in the Unite d States and overs eas . Most overseas 
business is at th e reque st of a comrnittee chairman, and the services 
ar e p articul ar ly sensitive to r e quests from these powerful figur es . 
C ommittee chairme n such as Congressman L. Mende l Rivers and 
S e n ator Richard Russell, of ·the Bouse and the Senat e Armed Services 
ComnJ.ittee s, have d ecisive influe nce on the outcome of military 
l egislation. 
Much of the office's contact with Congress is thr ough the 
staff member s of the various comm.ittees; M any staff counsels 
ar e conside r e d more influential than freshman m embe rs of a 
comnJ.ittee , as they hav e the 11 ear 11 of the comn"li.ttee chairman and 
have comple te knowledge of the . cornrnittee 1 s activities . 
The ori e ntation junke t is a particularl y useful liaison activity. 
The services take members of Congress to b ases , ships and special 
installations to show off the l atest e quipment and training programs . 
One l egis l ative liais on officer told journalist J ack R aymorid: "Our 
_l obbying e ffectiveness i s at its h e ight, not h e r e on C apital Hill, but 
in th e fi e ld where we g e t the Cong r essm e n to ' see for them selves . '"ll 





The office continually carries out " s p ecial proj ects," d esigned 
to educate cong r essmen about the Navy 0 Brie fings are arranged, 
parti cul a rly for freshman m embe rs, as well as CNO breakfasts 
and meetings with th e Sec r e tary. 
Congressmen r eceive a stagger'ing amount of p e rsonal mai l 
from constituents . Constituent inquiries frorn service memb e r s or 
their famili es , or concerning th e Navy, are r eferred t o the D epart-
m e nt of the Navy for comrnent or investigation. Although some of 
these l etters are clearly of the 11 crank 11 v~riety, each complaint or 
comment is investigate d and a r e ply sent to the inte r es ted mernber 
of Congress. Frequently a compl aint may prec ipitate the drafting 
of "r e l i e f l egisl a tion" f o r the C ongressman to introduce on b e h a lf 
of a constituent who has not r eceived l egal b enefits . This p arti cul a r 
acti v ity by the Office of L egislative Affairs was aptly d esc ribed 
as a N avy "ombudsman function" by a form e r staff memb e r . 
Whi l e l egi s l ati ve liaison office r s conduct dir ec t r e l a tion s 
with C ongress, public infornJ.ation officers try rnor e indirect m eans 
of cultivating favo r for se r vice programs . Publi city v ent u r es have 
bu rgeoned since Wo rld War II, when J ames F orrestal tried to make 
th e Navy aware of the nee d to " se ll the Navy" i n an atmosphe r e of 
service competition for reduc e d defense budge t s and what appea r ed 
to b e a genuine thr eat to Navy a ir frorn the Air Forc e . 
The Navy h as r e h1 c t antl y come to r eali ze the validity of 
Secret a ry Forr e stal ' s in s istence on publicity 0 Vincent Dav is b e lieves 
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"the inte ntional seeking of publicity r e mained odiou s to rnany , and 
probably most, sea offic e r s . II Davis says tradition-minde d N aval 
offi ce r s b e li e ve " se lling the Navy ' s case to the public should not be 
n ecessa ry and , in any cas e , it was uncornfortabl y political in natur e , 
not in accordanc e with the dignity of the pr ofession . " 12 This a ttitude 
c ertainl y pr e vail e d i mme diate l y follow ing Wor l d War II, and altho ugh 
echoes of it r e main t oday , the n ee d for favor a ble publicity is gene rall y 
accepte d. 
Th e N avy ' s Offic e of Info r mation is officia lly charge d with 
informing t h e naval se r vice about the N avy as an in s trument of 
. . 
nationa l poli cy and secu rity, and 11 th e r e spons ibilitie s and participation 
-
of nava l p e r sonne l as United Sta t es ci t izens unde r the Ame rican 
concept of gove rnment and society . II 13 The office stress e s the 
"continuing importance of seapowe r, 11 uncle r s t a nding the Navy's 
role toda y and l.n the fu tur e , th e n ee d for a mod e rn fl ee t and growing 
So vi e t naval s tr e ngth . 14 
Publi c informa tion h as also b een centraliz e d in the D e f e n se 
D e p artment under the Assistant S e cre t ary of D e fens e (Public Affa irs ). 
His offic e "coordinates action s , as a ppropria t e, with the military 
d e p a rtrnents and other D e p ar tment of De f e ns e agenci es h aving 
12. D a vis, The Admir a l s Lobby, p p . 279-280, 282 - 283. 
13. Unite d States Gove r mn e nt Organi zation M a nua l 1967 -68, p .l 81. 





collateral or r e l a t e d fun ctions . ,,l5 
Extra- service groups wi th no official status are a trird means 
of influ e ncing public and congressional opinion. These inc lude th e 
Navy L eag u e , the V e t e ran s of Fore ign Wars, the American L egion, 
The R e serve Offi ce rs A ssociation anci the Flee t R ese rve Association. 
Whil e th e N avy appreci a t es support from_ these organizations, th e r e 
i s no evidence of any such group acting as a "con spira toria l ally" 
of the service . 16 
In contrast, the Air Forc e Associatio-n provides a powe rful 
l obby for th e Air Force . Unlil\: e th e Navy L eag ue , acti ve duty Air 
Forc e Officers are p e rmitte d to join th e Air Forc e As sociation 
althou gh the ir p articipation is g ene r a lly passive . The Navy L eag ue 
con s i s t s of civilian business and civic l ead e rs who have a p e rsona l 
inte r e st in th e N avy and do not consider the L eague a political 
inte r es t - group. 
A final e l ement of congr e ssional r e lations as practic e d by 
the Navy is th e l east conducive to analysis, but i s perha p s the most 
important - continuing p e r sonal i n t eres t and conta ct b e twe e n the 
Navy and Congress . The l eas t of thi s contact is forma l t estimony 
b e for e cornrni ttee s, n1.u ch of w h ich may hav e b een worked out 
1 5 . Ibid., pp . 138 - 13 9. 
16. Armin Rappaport, The Navy L eag u e of the Uni t e d States 
{D etroit: Wa yne State Uni ve r si ty Press , 1962 ) , pp. 209-210 . 
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1n advance with fri endly Congressmen or Se nators. Wha t is mo s t 
ess e ntial to " t e lling the Navy ' s s t o ry" is for individual members 
of Congress to r eali ze that the Navy i s presenting an h ones t ca se 
in the b est inte r es t s of the n ation and the se r v ic e . This may b e 
"lobbying , 11 a distas t e ful word to naval officers in it s no r mal 
political cont ext; b ut the inte nt of the N avy l obby is to exec ute the 
service 's r espon sibilities to the nation and it s civili an l eade rship 
by propounding programs tha t e n a ble the s e rvic e to carry out it s 
mi ss ion s . 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
N aval officers h ave traditionally disliked and distruste d politics. 
Until World War II this negative attitudewas compounde d by a conser -
vative , decentrali ze d system of organi zation and a sta rtling inability 
to recogniz e th e Air Force 1 s "Ai r Pow e r" campaign as a threat to 
the Navy. Whe n naval officers first awoke to the situation their first 
efforts were hampe red by an astounding political naivete. 
In the b eginning of the unification s truggle, naval officers reli e d 
on short-term expediencies and felt that success in a single political 
engagement brought the matter to a clo se : Had it not been for the 
for ceful l ead e rship of Jarnes Forrestal, the Navy would h ave fared 
poorly . At that time senior nava l office rs l acke d political acumen 
and were r e l uctant and ill-prepared for 'political maneuverings. 
Admiral Arle igh A. Burke was the first senior officer to es tablish 
offices in the Navy to prepare long--term goals for the service and 
pr epare political action progress . 
The Navy's political activ i ty ha s b ee n l arge l y directed to the 
. Congress . For years naval offic e rs distruste d the political aspirations 
of appointed officials, an d focu se d on Congress as- .th e l ocus of respect -
able civilian control of the rnilitary . Conveni ently, this a llows 
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rationalization of any lobb ying activities as an apoliti cal p art of the ir 
constituti onal responsibilities to the l egi s l a ti ve b ran ch . 
E ven with th e unification controv e rsy . ost e n s ibly r e solve d, 
N avy -Ai r For ce disaffection e ffects much of military political activ ity 
~oday . To die -hard e l erne nts of the nava l offi cer corp s the Air Force 
is a "pres umptuous u surpe r" of Navy preroga tives , irresponsibl e 
tow a rd the nation ' s security in opposing b a l anced for ces t o e mphas iz e 
air powe r . Wor st of all , the A ii· For ce ha s no tr a ditions to s pea~ of. 
These opinions are held b y a small and diminishing nmnber of n aval 
offi cers , but are indic ative of th e residual bitte rness r es ulting from 
th e unifi cation b a ttl e . 
T h e strate gic a rgument that dominat e d the unifi cati on h earings 
and the "revolt of the Admir a l s 11 was not settle d until J ohn F . K e nnedy: ' s 
administrat ion , and s till appea r s on occasion . Even though the Korean 
War vindicate d the doct r ine of b a l anced forc e s, the Air For ce continue s 
its attempts to u se s trategi c bombing weapon s systems (the B - 52 ) to 
limite d war s ituations such as Vi e t Nam. 
Pres ident K enn e dy a p pointe d R obertS. M cNaina r a a s 
. . 
Sec r e tary of D e fense, and b e t ween them the y fir m ly es t a blish e d 
civilian control of the military establi s hment a s outline d i n the De fense 
R e organi zation Act of 19 58 . Through the brill iant administ r a ti ve 
t echniques including s~rstems anal ys i s and the Plann e d Program Budge t 
S ys t em McNama r a took one tr a ditional arena for service c01npe t ition -
the budg e t - and p ut it firmly in th e h ands of t h e S ec r eta ry. 
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Both President K ennedy and President Johnson h ave b een 
dir ectl y involve d in th e conduct of rnilitary operations because of th e 
highly politi cal nature of lirr~ited war . Although military offic e rs h ave 
b ecome n1.ore invol ved i n th e formulation of national policy, they h ave 
l ess inde pende nce 1n th e administration and employment of the ir 
forces . 
Owing to s trong, c entr a li zed cont~ol of the military in the 
~xecutive branch, the N a vy ha s l ess opportunity for o ve rt lobbying 
with Congress on b ehalf o f service policie s . Programs pre sen t e d 
to th e Congress b y the D e p artment of Defense h ave r eplace d those 
previous ly p resent e d by the indiv idua l s.e rvi ces . 
Even the N avy ' s congressiona l re l at i ons and public information 
activities a r e " coor dinated" in the Offic e of the S ec r e tar y of D e f ense 
to pr e sent un ifi e d D e fe n se D e partment propo sal s t o C ongress and the 
publi c . This system i s d esigned to prevent public disclo s ure of the 
type of inters e r vic e bi ckering tha t distorted th e unification h earings 
and th e formula tion of po s t- war militar y s trategy . 
These conditions m ake it n e cessary for naval officers to advocate 
s e r vice poli cies within th e E xec utive branc h, through th e Sec r e t a ry 
of the Navy and the J()int Chiefs of Staff . F or thi s r eason the Chie f 
of L egis l ative Affairs was gi ven more authority to es t a bli s h contact 
w ith gove r nment agenci es in the E xec utive branch . Acco r dingly, 
much of the advocacy of Navy prograrns pr ev iou s l y conducted openly 





a D e fe n se Departrn e nt p rog r am i s d ecide d upon, individua l se r v ic e 
opinion s a r e a b a ndone d. 
In spite of D e fe n se D e p a rtment c e ntra li zation th e Navy mu s t 
m a intain c lo se r e l a tions w ith Cong r es s . C ongress d e m a nd s acc ess 
t o milita ry offi ce r s ' profe s s ional opinion in c a rr yin g out l egis l a tive 
o v e rsi ght of administr a t i on polici es . T h e individual s e rvic e s ' 
l e gis l a tiv e a ffa irs offic es a r e a l s o invol v e d in a cquiring support for 
.De f e n se D e p a rhne nt progra m s . 
Mo s t :importa nt to n a va l offi ce r s , howe v e r , i s the alte rna ti ve 
offe r e d by C ong r e s s shoul d the civilia n l e ade r ship i n the E xe cut ive 
b ran ch d ec ide on programs th e N av y b e.lie ve s not in the inte r e st s of 
t h e s e rvi ce . Frorn the N a vy's point of vi e w , what is b es t for t he 
se r vi ce 1s inextrica bly bound to wha t is b e st for n a tiona l s e cu r i t y . 
In s uch ca se s the offi ce r corp s m a y b e w illing to ri s k surr e p t itiou s 
advo cac y o f N a vy policy in Congress , hoping for d e.b a t e a n d discu s sion 
of t h e m a t te r in congr e ssional com mittee s . 
E v e n though t h e N a vy m ay b e advancing a p a ro chi a l vi e wpoint, 
s u ch adv o cac y do e s e n a ble th e Cong r ess t o p e rform it s adve r sary 
. r o l e towa rd E xec utive prog r a ms. 
T h e ultirnat e deci s ion s on si gnifi cant ques tion s of military 
p o li c y a r e mad e by th e Pr es ide nt. Altho ugh th e c i vili a n l ead e rship 
i n th e Office of the Sec r e t ar y of De f e n se and the J oi n t Chi e f s of Sta ff 
coop e r a t e i n eval uating s u ch ques t i on s , t h e President w i ll g e.ne r a lly 




The ques tion of whether the Secret a ry of D e fense can effectively 
pass judgment on all military p olicy is d e bata ble . C e rtainly 
Secr e tary McNamara ' s system is n1.ore efficient than thos e previously 
u sed in the· De p ar tme nt? but e rrors in judgment may prove 1nore 
· diffi c ult to disc ov e r and more expensive to correct . The efficacy of 
this system n1.ay d e p end on such subjective qua liti es as the persona li -
ti es and abilities of the Sec r e t ar y of D efens e and his imme diate staff . 
Accordingly, naval ·offi cers are convinced of the n ece ssity· 
of avenues to Cm1g r ess . The office r co r p s b e lieves tha t the nationa l 
i nte r est is b est serve d by Congress taki ng an active role in matte rs 
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